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ABSTRACT. For decades, the individual health insurance market failed to provide consumers
adequate or affordable health coverage. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) sought to change this
state of affairs, establishing a new Patient's Bill of Rights and instituting other protections that
require insurers to make comprehensive coverage readily accessible. However, recent reports
have begun to document health plans' violations of the ACA, such as their failure to pay consum-
ers their required refunds or the illegal imposition of waiting periods for transplant services. Alt-
hough the ACA preserves a role for states in implementing and enforcing the law, state remedies
are often lacking. For instance, many state consumer protection laws do not apply to insurance,
while traditional breach of contract claims only provide for recourse when a health insurance pol-
icy expressly incorporates ACA provisions. As a result, a critical gap in the law has come to light:
the absence of a private right of action. This Note proposes that state courts can address this gap
by finding that the sale of individual health insurance comes with an implicit and legally enforce-
able promise that the policy and insurer administering it are in full compliance with the ACA. In
other words, this Note urges courts to establish an "implied warranty of legality" in the context
of individual health insurance. Modeled on the implied warranty of habitability, this approach
would correct for power imbalances within this market. It would also promote individual rights
by empowering consumers to sue when they have been wronged and foster civic engagement by
enabling consumers to play an active role in the enforcement of public law. The implied warranty
of legality would also have redistributive effects, allowing for the costs of noncompliance to be
shared more evenly across the market. Looking beyond the ACA, the implied warranty of legality
should also be applied in other regulated markets with similar dynamics, or, if the ACA is scaled
back or repealed, to enforce state health insurance rules that seek to protect consumers from un-
lawful insurer practices.
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INTRODUCTION
The individual health insurance market plays an important residual func-
tion in the U.S. health care system, serving individuals and families who can-
not access or afford employer-sponsored insurance but who earn too much to
qualify for Medicaid.' Until recently, however, this market frequently failed to
provide these consumers adequate or affordable health coverage. Premiums
were often prohibitively expensive for consumers,2 especially women, older
adults, and less healthy people whom insurers could charge higher rates.' In-
surers also considered some consumers - from pregnant women and expectant
fathers to individuals who had suffered from acne, allergies, or bunions -
"uninsurable" and would deny them any coverage.' In addition, some insurers
would strategically rescind coverage when consumers became sick, denying
consumers the benefits for which they had contracted and paid.s To the extent
that individual consumers could obtain and retain individual health insurance
coverage, their policies typically provided limited protection against out-of-
1. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and
Prospects for Change, 23 HEALTHAFrF. 79, 8o (2004).
2. See Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure To Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is
Not a Viable Option for Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 (July 2009), http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2009/jul/failure-to
-protect/130odoty-failure-to-protectindividual insmarketib_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7RFC-7UJ5] ("Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents said they never bought a plan,
with 61 percent of those who did not buy a plan in the individual market citing expensive
premiums as the main reason.").
3. See id. ("People who buy coverage in the individual market must pay the full premium and,
in most states, are rated on the basis of their health or age . . . ."); Nowhere To Turn: How the
Individual Health Insurance Market Fails Women, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR., 8-10, 13 (20o8),
http://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2o15/o8/NWLCReport-NowhereToTurn-813o9w.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QUV6-AGD4].
4. See David S. Hilzenrath, Papers Show Insurers Limited Coverage for Acne, Pregnancy, WASH.
PosT (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/o9
/18/AR2oo9o918o35o.html [http://perma.cc/M4JH-7C8H].
5. See Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce Staff to Members & Staff of
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations 10-13 (June 16, 2009), http://www.ct.gov
/oha/lib/oha/documents/pdftestimony/us house comm onenergy-and commerceme
mo 6 16o _onrecissionofhealth insurance-policies.pdf [http://perma.cc/7WCR
-337R] (describing how insurance companies would rescind coverage because consumers
had failed to report conditions that were unknown at the time they were applying for cover-
age or because of other unrelated discrepancies in their applications); Cancer Patient Tells of
-Rips in Health Insurance Safety Net, CNN (June 16, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/200 9 /POLITICS/o6/16/health.care.hearing [http://perma.cc/3KRW-SZSB].
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pocket medical costs, covered fewer benefits, and imposed greater restrictions
than did employer-sponsored plans.'
These practices played a central role in Congress's decision to enact the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as the ACA.' The
first set of ACA reforms, collectively referred to as the Patient's Bill of Rights,
became effective on September 23, 2010, six months after the law was enacted.'
Among other things, the Patient's Bill of Rights prohibits insurers from impos-
ing annual and lifetime dollar limits on coverage,' discriminating against chil-
dren with pre-existing conditions,'o and rescinding coverage absent fraud or
intentional misrepresentation by the consumer." These rules also require in-
surers to cover preventive care without cost-sharing12 and to allow children to
stay on their parent's health plan until they reach the age of twenty-six." Even
more robust patient protections became effective in 2014. For example, in 2014,
the ACA extended the rules against pre-existing condition denials to adults' 4
and imposed community rating requirements that limit insurers' ability to vary
rates based on individual characteristics, such as age, gender, and health sta-
tus." The ACA also required insurers to cover a broad range of "essential
health services," including prescription drugs, maternity care, and rehabilitative
and habilitative services.16 Plans sold through the newly launched health insur-
6. See Doty, supra note 2, at 4-7.
7. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) ("In the
Affordable Care Act, Congress addressed the problem of those who cannot obtain insurance
coverage because of preexisting conditions or other health issues."); David Simas, Why We
Passed the Affordable Care Act in the First Place, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 30, 2013,
6:39 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/10/30/why-we-passed-affordable-care
-act-first-place [http://perma.cc/H4ZN-YF5M].
8. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Patient's Bill of Rights, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID
& MEDICARE, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance
-Market-Reforms/Patients-Bill-of-Rights.html [http://perma.cc/2FGZ-Y9YU]; see also A
New Patient's Bill of Rights, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents
/healthcare-fact-sheets/patients-bill-rights.pdf [http://perma.cc/44AF-UJZ9].
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a)(1) (2012).
lo. See id. § 300gg-3(d).
11. See id. § 300gg-12.
12. See id. § 300gg-13(a).
13. See id. § 300gg-14(a).
14. See id. §§ 300gg-3, -4.
15. See id. 5 300gg(a).
16. See id. § 300gg-6(a).
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ance marketplaces must meet additional requirements, such as network ade-
quacy and marketing rules."
Despite these new rules, consumers still face obstacles to adequate and
affordable health coverage. Multiple insurers, for instance, have continued to
charge consumers copays for preventive services, such as birth control, that the
law requires insurers to make available without cost-sharing." Other insurers
have issued policies excluding coverage of transplant services for new enrollees,
contravening the law's prohibitions on benefit-specific waiting periods.19 And
one insurer has been accused of cheating individual market enrollees out of $35
million in rebates under the ACA's medical loss ratio rules, which require insur-
ers to pay refunds if they do not spend eighty percent or more of premium dol-
lars on health care expenditures or quality improvement.2 0
Consumers injured by these insurer violations and others are presented
with limited options for recourse. Consumers may appeal certain adverse ben-
efit denials using their health plans' internal procedures and hope that their in-
surers self-correct or, if that fails, ask an external reviewer to reconsider their
claims.2 1 If the appeals process does not address consumers' problems, con-
sumers may take their complaints to state and federal regulators, and hope -
17. See id. § 18031(c)(1).
18. See State of Women's Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable Care Act,
NAT'L WOMEN's L. CTR., 8 (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateof
coverage2ol5final.pdf [http://perma.cc/67QX-52KS].
ig. See id. at 17-18.
20. See Bob Herman, Blue Shield of California Faces Class-Action Lawsuit over Incorrect Rebates,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 14, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160714
/NEWS/160719940 [http://perma.cc/4U7N-6GEL].
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-19(a)-(b); 45 C.F.R. § 14 7 -13 6(b)(2)(ii)(C) (2014). This is an im-
portant procedural protection for consumers who are denied treatments covered by their
health policy if, for example, the insurer contends that it is not medically necessary. Howev-
er, this protection does not provide recourse when a consumer's argument is based not on
the terms of his or her policy, but on the legal protections in the ACA itself. Moreover, even
when a consumer's complaint falls within the scope of the appeals process, the process may
prove inadequate if the consumer has multiple claims that he or she wants resolved at once,
if the consumer wants to conduct discovery or present testimonial evidence in support of his
or her claims, or if the consumer seeks damages for injuries caused by illegal benefit denials
or coverage terminations. See Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litiga-
tion Reform, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 649, 671-72 (2014); Wade S. Hauser, Note, Does Iowa's Health
Care External Review Process Replace Common-Law Rights?, 99 IOwA L. REV. 1401, 1428-29
(2014); see also John V. Jacobi et al., Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care
Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PA.
ST. L. REv. 109, 134 (2015) (noting that appeals processes can come with shorter filing dead-
lines than civil actions).
1122
126:1118 2017
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
perhaps in vain -that these regulators intervene.22 But what consumers cannot
do, at least under federal law, is sue. Despite the myriad ways in which the ACA
transformed the substantive laws governing individual health insurance, the
ACA did not create a private right of action that could empower consumers to
require insurers to comply with these rules and pay damages if consumers are
injured when they do not.23
The law's reluctance to provide a private right of action under federal law
may stem, in part, from the law's deference to the historic role of states when it
comes to insurance regulation.24 States have long been the primary regulators
of insurance, a fact that Congress recognized and enshrined in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945.25 The Act officially declared that federal law shall not be
construed to limit or override state laws regulating insurance unless Congress's
intent to do so is clear.26 While the ACA was an unprecedented federal inter-
vention into state authority, it did not disrupt the general framework estab-
lished by the McCarran-Ferguson Act: federal law serves as a floor upon which
state law can build.2 7 Thus, consumers may turn to state law where the ACA is
22. See infra Section L.A (discussing the shortcomings of public enforcement in insurance). For a
helpful description of the ACA's public enforcement scheme, see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Im-
plementing Health Reform in an Era of Semi-Cooperative Federalism: Lessons from the Age 26 Ex-
pansion, 10 J. HEALTH &BIOMEDICALL. 327, 340-46 (2015).
23. Maher, supra note I, at 672. One important exception is section 1557, which prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability under health
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, administered by an executive
agency, or established under Title I of the ACA. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557, 124 Stat. 119, 260 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a)
(2012)). Unlike the ACA's private insurance market reforms, section 1557 has been interpret-
ed to create a private right of action, at least with respect to claims of disparate treatment.
See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,440 (May
18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) ("[The Office of Civil Rights] interprets Section 1557
as authorizing a private right of action for claims of disparate impact discrimination on the
basis of any of the criteria enumerated in the legislation.").
24. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76
WASH. L. REV. 67, 118 (2001) ("Modern federal legislation often regulates matters that tradi-
tionally were left to the states. Congress does not usually preempt state law, but instead leg-
islates against the backdrop of state law. Reading federal statutes liberally to maximize the
creation of rights, rights of action, and remedies may invade state prerogatives in ways that
Congress did not intend. In many instances state remedies are available to cure wrongdoing
and federal remedies are unnecessary." (footnote omitted)).
25. See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1011 et seq.(2012)).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-12 (2012).
27. See infra Section I.A.
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lacking." As this Note will show, however, relying on already established state
laws to enforce the ACA is much like trying to fit a square peg into a round
hole. You might squeeze it in sometimes, but the hole is not the best fit and
often will not work at all. For example, consumers may be able to bring a
breach of contract claim under state law when the policy terms of their insur-
ance plans are ambiguous and the ACA favors one interpretation, but consum-
ers may be without a remedy for violations of provisions that are not expressly
incorporated in their contracts.2 9
In response to the inadequacy of existing options, this Note proposes that
state courts recognize an "implied warranty of legality," a single, comprehensive
state cause of action that allows consumers to privately enforce the ACA."o Un-
der the implied warranty of legality, the sale of an individual health insurance
policy would carry with it an implied, enforceable promise that the policy and
the insurer administering it are and will remain in full compliance with the
ACA for the policy's term."1 Failure to comply with the ACA would constitute a
28. See, e.g., Joseph Friedman et al., A Crystal Ball: Managed Care Litigation in Light of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 27 HEALTH L. 1, 3 (2014) (" [ACA] claims may be raised
through other statutes that do contain a private right of action (e.g., ERISA or state insur-
ance or other law) by applying [the ACA's] relevant provision as the legal standard against
which the claim is measured."); Maher, supra note 21, at 672 ("[A] claimant has the right to
bring suit under whatever law, pre-ACA, governed the insurance policy his claim arises un-
der."); Wendy K. Mariner, Health Insurance Is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40 AM. J.L. &
MED. 195, 211 (2014) ("In theory, patients can sue a private insurer under state law for claims
denials and other causes of action.").
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. This Note borrows this term from section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, an Act of
the Parliament of the United Kingdom, which provides that "[t] here is an implied warranty
that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so far as the assured can control the
matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner." Marine Insurance Act 1906, 6
Edw. 7 c. 41, § 41 (Gr. Brit.). According to one description of the warranty, "If the managers
[of a ship] are negligent in taking the necessary steps to prevent an illegality during the per-
formance of the adventure, the assured will be in breach of the implied warranty of legality."
BARIs SOYER, WARRANTIES IN MARINE INSURANCE 127 (2d ed. 20o6); see also Guy Manchuk,
Armed Guards, Marine Insurance, and the Implied Warranty of Legality, 24 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.
309, 341, 349-50 (2011-12) (discussing how the warranty may cover situations where illegali-
ty is clear on the face of the policy as well as situations where illegality only arises during the
course of an adventure). The implied warranty of legality, as used here, would operate simi-
larly, protecting consumers from unlawful policy terms and from unlawful insurance prac-
tices that occur over the term of the policy.
31. This Note focuses exclusively on the individual insurance market. While many of the ACA's
private insurance reforms also apply to employer-sponsored insurance, the question of
whether the implied warranty of legality would be preempted under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) adds a layer of complication that this Note will
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breach of the implied warranty and be actionable in court for either prospective
(i.e., injunctive) or compensatory relief, with the goal of placing the consumer
in the position he or she would have been in had no violation occurred.
The implied warranty of legality has a robust lineage. This Note draws in-
spiration from the original judicial opinions that created the implied warranty
of habitability, which revolutionized the relationship between landlords and
tenants using a theory based on the classic doctrines of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness. 32 The implied warranty of legality also may be
viewed as an expansion of and improvement upon the reasonable expectations
doctrine -a half-century old approach to interpreting insurance contracts that
is meant to favor consumers, who are often relatively powerless and infor-
mation-poor market actors.
Like other implied warranties, the implied warranty of legality is attractive
for its intuitive simplicity. Just as the implied warranty of merchantability
promises consumers that the goods they purchase "are fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such goods are used"3 4 - for example, that a refrigerator keeps
its contents cold -the implied warranty of legality promises consumers who
purchase individual health insurance that the policy does what the law says it
must. Unlike the reasonable expectations doctrine, however, the implied war-
ranty of legality imposes no new, unexpected obligations on insurers. Rather, it
holds insurers accountable for promises implicit in the private health insurance
market in a post-ACA world.
More broadly, the instinct behind this proposal- to provide a remedy for
individuals who have suffered an injury due to others' legal violations -is cen-
turies old.3" Civil recourse theorists, such as John Goldberg, draw on social
contract theory to argue that the state should provide opportunities for redress
via private law in order to compensate for the law's restrictions on individuals'
ability to seek private retribution.36 Others, like Nathan Oman, frame the im-
not discuss. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 21, at 673-74 (discussing ERISA preemption of state
law claims).
32. See infra Section II.A.
33. See infra Section I.B.3.
34. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002).
35. See, e.g., Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1319-22 (2003) (tracing the idea of the right to a remedy back to Blackstone and Coke).
36. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541 (2005); see also, e.g., Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51VAND. L. REv. 1, 86 (1998)
("The idea of civil recourse is a desirable solution to the social contractor. Consenting to
comply with all the rules, even after one's rights are violated, does not entail giving up all
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pulse for recourse as a question of honor.17 Oman points to John Grisham's
novel The Rainmaker, where a mother sues an insurance company for denying
medical treatment to her dying son, to help illustrate this point: "By suing the
company, by standing up to it, the mother transformed herself from a passive
victim into an agent, an equal who could demand and receive respect."" The
implied warranty of legality seeks to give real consumers that same opportuni-
ty.
The remainder of this Note proceeds in three major parts. Part I begins by
explaining the important role of state law in this area. Critically, the ACA pre-
serves states' traditional role in health insurance regulation and does not
preempt state causes of action that enable consumers to sue to enforce the law.
Yet existing state causes of action that consumers may try to use for this pur-
pose fail to provide a comprehensive private enforcement regime. Most im-
portantly, no single cause of action would enable enforcement of the full array
of the ACA's various consumer rights and protections.
To fill this gap, Part II proposes that states adopt an implied warranty of le-
gality. This approach is modeled on the implied warranty of habitability, and
the reasons given by courts for adopting it apply equally to the individual
health insurance market under the ACA. Additionally, the implied warranty of
legality, like the implied warranty of habitability, is based in the common law,
thus negating any need for state legislative action. Part II also describes how
the implied warranty of legality would operate in practice. This discussion in-
cludes consideration of how courts would construct the warranty -including
the basis on which courts could hold insurers liable, whether insurers should
be allowed to disclaim the warranty, and the remedies that would be available,
as well as potential barriers to adoption. As proposed, the implied warranty of
legality would run the risk of increasing premiums, but these increases are jus-
tifiable on redistributive grounds. Additionally, while insurers are likely to raise
the primary jurisdiction and filed rate doctrines as bars to litigation, these doc-
trines should have minimal impact on consumers' ability to seek recourse un-
der the implied warranty of legality.
possibility of redress should others invade one's own rights. Conversely, consenting to be
subject to a wide variety of duties to others does not entail being vulnerable to a similarly
wide range of possible criminal sanctions. While the state takes away the liberty of private
retribution, it offers a right to civil redress in its place. While it creates in each a vulnerability
to action under the law, it provides in return protection from the threat of private retribu-
tion.").
37. See Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FoRDHAM L. REV. 31, 32-34 (2011).
38. Id. at 62.
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Part III concludes by considering if and when the implied warranty of le-
gality could be applied to regulatory regimes beyond the ACA. The ACA's nar-
row approach to preemption means that preemption should not pose a barrier
to the adoption of the proposed implied warranty of legality. Although this re-
sult is not assured under other federal statutes, Supreme Court precedent gen-
erally preserves state causes of action-like the implied warranty of legality-
that parallel but do not expand federal requirements. Moreover, the implied
warranty could be applied to enforce state health insurance rules in the event
that the ACA's federal protections are scaled back. Assuming preemption is not
an obstacle, the implied warranty could also be extended beyond the individual
health insurance context and would be most justified in markets that resemble
insurance and housing - for instance, markets where participation is involun-
tary and goods carry high societal importance.
I. THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF STATE LAW UNDER THE ACA
The ACA transformed health insurance regulation in the United States by
setting comprehensive new federal standards intended to improve the afforda-
bility, adequacy, and accessibility of individual health insurance." Yet contrary
to conventional wisdom, the ACA is far from a "federal takeover of health in-
surance."40 Rather, the ACA maintains states' historical responsibility to both
establish and enforce the law governing health insurance. Indeed, the law self-
avowedly left in place the "federalism framework" under which states serve as
the primary regulators of insurance." This Part describes this framework and
argues that it allows states to provide for private enforcement of the ACA even
in the absence of a federal private right of action. An analysis of existing state
causes of action illustrates the extent to which consumers can rely on current
law to enforce the ACA and seek relief from injuries arising from violations
thereof. This analysis reveals that these causes of action provide only a piece-
39. See Katie Keith et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Action on the 2014 Market
Reforms, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2-3 (Feb. 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-
/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2oBrief/2o13/1662 Keithimplementing-ACAstate-acti
on_2o4_reformbrief-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/L9K7-FXD6].
40. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can Regu-
late Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 277 (2013).
41. Sara Rosenbaum, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the Future of U.S. Health Policy
Under the Affordable Care Act, 15 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 167, 173 (2014); see also id. at 178
(describing the "conceptual approach to insurance reform" as "preserving state primacy over
health insurance regulation while introducing transformational federal standards designed
to fundamentally remake the market at its core").
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meal remedy and that a more comprehensive solution is necessary to ensure
consumers benefit from the full array of rights and protections provided them
by the ACA.
A. State Regulatory and Enforcement Powers Under the ACA
States have long served as the default regulators of insurance. In fact, up
until 1944, when the Supreme Court recognized that interstate insurance trans-
actions fell within Congress's Commerce Clause power, state regulatory power
was exclusive.4 2 The Supreme Court's decision reversing precedent prompted a
swift reaction from Congress, but rather than exercise its newfound authority,
Congress disclaimed it." Specifically, in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,
Congress declared that continued state regulation of insurance was "in the pub-
lic interest" 4 and provided that congressional action should not be interpreted
to "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state regulation absent a clear intent to do
so.4s While Congress since has intervened significantly in the context of em-
ployer-sponsored benefit plans, until the ACA, Congress largely left regulation
and enforcement of individual insurance to the states, only setting certain min-
imum standards.46
The ACA greatly expanded the breadth and scope of federal regulations
governing the individual insurance market but preserved the state-centric ap-
proach to individual insurance regulation along two dimensions. First, states
may continue to strengthen health insurance regulation.4 7 For example, while
42. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944). Prior to this ruling,
the Supreme Court repeatedly had held that the business of insurance was not commerce
and thus not subject to federal regulation. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Cry., 231
U.S. 495, 502-12 (1913); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 653-56 (1895); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. 168, 182-85 (1868).
43. See Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health
Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 398 (2005).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012).
45. Id. 5 1ol2(b).
46. See, e.g., Jost & Hall, supra note 43, at 397-99 (comparing ERISA with the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996); Rosenbaum, supra note 41, at 173-74 (same).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-62(a) (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Ex-
change and Insurance Market Standards for 2015 and Beyond, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,808, 15,862
(proposed Mar. 21, 2014) (to be codified in scattered sections of 45 C.F.R.) ("States have sig-
nificant latitude to impose requirements with respect to health insurance coverage that are
more restrictive than the Federal law requirements."); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under
Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 596 (2011) ("In making clear that states can impose ad-
ditional requirements, both measures [the ACA and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
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the ACA allows health insurers to charge older adults rates up to three times
more than what they charge younger adults, states may demand that health in-
surers apply the same rates to all customers, regardless of age." Second, states
remain the primary enforcers of both federal and state health insurance regula-
tions in the individual market.4'9
and Consumer Protection Act] thus come down firmly on the side of federal law serving as a
regulatory floor, rather than as a regulatory ceiling." (footnote omitted)).
48. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Approaches to Premium
Rate Reforms in the Individual Health Insurance Market, COMMONWEALTH FUND
2-3 (Dec. 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue
brief/2o14/dec/1795_giovannelli-implementing-aca-statepremium ratereforms rb v2
.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7TS-CVCK].
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1) (2012). The federal government may take over responsibility
for enforcement only if it determines that the state has failed to "substantially enforce" the
law. See id. § 300gg-22(a)(2). This process has been described as "almost painfully deferen-
tial to state powers." Rosenbaum, supra note 41, at 181; see also Katherine T. Vukadin,
Obamacare Interrupted: Obstructive Federalism and the Consumer Information Blockade, 63
BUFF. L. REv. 421, 462 (2015) ("The federal fallback remains an option, but can it really be
effective? Its role is limited by logistical issues as well as state primacy in such matters -the
measured approach to enforcement reflected in HHS's statements reflects these limitations.
The federal government's approach to enforcement is incremental and careful out of fear of
being labelled unconstitutional commandeering." (footnotes omitted)). With respect to the
ACA's insurance market reforms, federal regulators have asked that states provide notice if
they do not have statutory authority to enforce the market reforms or otherwise choose not
do so. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Compliance and Enforcement,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and
-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/compliance.html [http://perma.cc/7Z33
-JHRN]. As an alternative to fully taking over enforcement, CMS also announced that it
was willing to work in collaboration with states that are "willing and able to perform regula-
tory functions but lack[] enforcement authority." Id. As of January 1, 2014, five states had
asked the federal government to assume enforcement authority and three had entered col-
laborative enforcement arrangements. See Katie Keith & Kevin W. Lucia, Implementing the
Affordable Care Act: The State of the States, COMMONWEALTH FUND 13 (Jan. 2014), http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%2oReport/2oi4/Jan/1727
_KeithimplementingACA state of states.pdf [http://perma.cc/9GNK-6ZY5]. Experi-
ence to date suggests that federal intervention in enforcement will be rare absent invitation.
Studies by the General Accountability Office have found that the federal government failed
to intervene to enforce provisions of HIPAA in the face of state inaction. Rosenbaum et
al., supra note 22, at 358 n.182 (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-
217R, PRIvATE HEALTH INSURANCE: HCFA CAUTIOUS IN ENFORCING FEDERAL HIPAA STAND-
ARDS IN STATES LACKING CONFORMING LAWS (1998); and U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO/HEHS-oo-85, IMPLEMENTATION OF HIPAA: PROGRESS SLOW IN ENFORCING FED-
ERAL STANDARDS IN NON-CONFORMING STATES (2000)). Recent experience suggests that the
federal government will be no more proactive: even though Arizona enacted a statute in
April 2015 prohibiting the state "from using any personnel or financial resources to enforce,
administer or cooperate with the [A]ffordable [C]are [A]ct," see ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-
271(A) (2015), eighteen months later, it is still not listed among the states where the federal
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Unfortunately, state public enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to pro-
vide consumers complete protection from violations of the law. These typically
include review and approval of policy forms, review and approval of premium
rates, complaint processing, oversight of claims payment practices and adver-
tising, and periodic market conduct reviews.s Violations may be met with the
imposition of corrective action plans, fines, and orders to refund money to con-
sumers, among other measures.s' Because states are responsible for licensing
health insurers, they may also take action on the license in response to severe
violations.52 Yet prior work examining state insurance regulation has found
that insurance departments tend to "underperform in their efforts to protect
and support consumers' interests."5 3 Regulatory capture54 and limited re-
government had taken over enforcement authority, see Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Over-
sight, supra.
50. See Elizabeth Abbott et al., Strengthening the Value and Performance of Health Insurance Market
Conduct Examination Programs: Consumer Recommendations for Regulators and Lawmakers,
HEALTH MGMT. Ass'N 15 (Nov. 2013), http://www.naic.org/documents/committeescon
liaisonrelatedhealthmce.pdf [http://perma.cc/F25X-L6HJ]; How Private Coverage
Works: A Primer, 2oo8 Update, HENRYJ. KAISERFAM. FOUND. 8-lo (Apr. 2008), http://kaiser
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2o13/o1/7766.pdf [http://perma.cc/6RJJ-55GW].
51. See Abbott et al., supra note So, at 16.
52. See How Private Coverage Works: A Primer, 2oo8 Update, supra note 5o, at 2-3, 9.
s3. Cassandra B. Roeder, Reforming Consumer-Insurer Dispute Resolution in the Auto Insurance
Industry, 14 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 151, 159 (2014); see also, e.g., Deborah F. Sanders, Unfair Settle-
ment Practice Acts: Should Legislators Expressly Create or Should Courts Imply a Private Cause of
Action for Third Parties?, 4 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 295, 298-300 (1989) ("Moreover, when
statutes have sufficient enforcement power, agencies have been criticized for failing to use
their enforcement power against violators. Very few state insurance commissioners who
have the power to enforce [unfair settlement practice] statutes have exercised that power to
protect claimants from unfair settlement practices." (footnotes omitted)).
54. See Roeder, supra note 53, at 159 ("Many state insurance commissioners are former industry
executives, and thus some believe the regulatory environment is stacked against consumer
interests due to industry capture. It has also been argued that the nature of the company-
consumer relationship causes an inherent power imbalance; a small group of organized,
highly motivated companies is better-equipped to lobby effectively than a large group of
consumers, each of whom has only a small stake in a given financial service contract." (foot-
notes omitted)); see also Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2011) (arguing that regulatory capture will have a particularly neg-
ative effect "in the context of consumer protection, where regulated entities have quite
strong interests in deregulation, and consumers, the beneficiaries of regulation, are a large,
dispersed group of individuals, each with a limited stake in regulatory outcomes"); Harvey
Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 113 (1998) ("'Capture'
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sourcess have frequently been proffered as explanations for this shortcoming.
Studies tracking state implementation of the ACA similarly suggest that many
states lack the ability or willingness to closely monitor insurer compliance and
bring enforcement actions when violations are uncovered. In some cases, this is
driven by a lack of capacity or institutional knowledge of how to enforce provi-
sions of the ACA that are novel to the state.S6 In other instances of inaction,
state regulators lack the legal authority to directly enforce some or all of the
ACA's market reforms." Effective administrative enforcement also depends on
55. See Roeder, supra note 53, at 160 ("State insurance departments frequently lack adequate fi-
nancial resources and as a result are often understaffed."). Roeder goes on to highlight re-
ports showing that consumer complaint resolution, in particular, gets short shrift. See id. For
more detail on the examples that Roeder uses, see Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 661-63 (1999). See also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of In-
surance, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 663 (2013) ("Ideally, the insurance commissioner stands in
the shoes of potential policyholders, disapproving policy terms that would be unacceptable
to purchasers if they were in a position to understand, bargain about, or reject them. In
practice, however, authority to regulate policy forms and premium rates is only lightly exer-
cised, except for occasional forays into the high-volume consumer auto and homeowners
lines of insurance. One reason is that regulatory resources are extremely limited, given the
sheer volume of policy form and rate filings. Realistically, regulators can scrutinize only a
small percentage of filings." (footnote omitted)); Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health
Care in an Era of Reform, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 225, 232 (2010) ("States lack the resources to
enforce either antitrust or consumer protection prohibitions against the insurance indus-
try. . . .").
56. See, e.g., Jacobi et al., supra note 21, at 157 ("[I]n practice, many states 'do little to assess their
network adequacy. To the extent state regulators provide oversight, it is most commonly in
response to consumer complaints.'" (quoting Quynh Chi Nguyen, Network Adequacy:
What Advocates Need To Know, COMMUNITY CATALYST 2 (Jan. 2014), http://www
.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/Network-Adequacy-what-advo
cates-need-to-knowFINAL-ol-28-1 4 .pdf [http://perma.cc/F2QW-66BP])); Katie Keith et
al., Nondiscrimination Under the Affordable Care Act, GEO. U. HEALTH PoL'Y INST. 11
(July 2013), http://georgetown.box.com/shared/static/c4wvixauvv5z3oxhir82.pdf [http://
perma.cc/MN37-69S8] ("Regulators reported difficulty in conducting a meaningful review
of the adequacy of drug formularies to ensure that plans do not discriminate based on, for
example, expected length of life or disability. Some noted that this type of in-depth review
would be an expansion of their traditional regulatory role because it requires an understand-
ing of the latest drug treatments, patient needs, and evidence-based treatments. This type of
review is made even more difficult by the fact that insurers change their formularies fre-
quently."); id. at 15 (noting that regulators "raised concerns that states may not have suffi-
cient resources to devote to a more in-depth review").
57. See Katie Keith et al., supra note 39, at 2-3. While some officials may attempt to encourage
voluntary compliance as part of their policy and rate review processes, regulators have
shared that they may be unable to "respond to consumer complaints, require an insurer to
change its practices, or impose sanctions without express authority to enforce federal law."
Id. at 11. Instead, regulators have "sought ways to characterize their oversight in terms that
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robust market conduct examinations that allow for ongoing monitoring of in-
surers after rates and policies are approved," but it appears unlikely that these
examinations will be conducted with sufficient regularity or thoroughness to
provide meaningful protection to consumers, since they can be costly and time-
consuming. And, even if regulators do eventually intervene, it may only come
after consumers have experienced injury.60
These drawbacks have led others to conclude that private enforcement is
necessary to complement public enforcement.61 Of course, leaving in place state
public enforcement power does not necessarily mean that federal law allows
private causes of action arising under state law. But Congress was clear in the
ACA that state law is not preempted unless it "prevent[s] the application" of
the ACA's insurance reforms." In the only appellate decision interpreting this
preemption language to date, the Eighth Circuit described the set of cases in
which preemption applies as "narrow" and held that "only those state laws that
'hinder or impede' the implementation of the ACA run afoul of the Supremacy
Clause."63 The same clause has elsewhere been termed an "anti-preemption
provision," amid speculation that it may even preserve state laws that frustrate
but do not directly block or contradict federal law, in contrast to general princi-
ples of obstacle preemption.
Nothing in the text of the ACA suggests that this anti-preemption provi-
sion is limited to the substantive requirements that a state may set for insur-
effectively soft-peddled their regulatory powers in favor of a partnering or technical support
role with the health insurance industry" Rosenbaum et al., supra note 22, at 351.
s8. See Abbott et al., supra note 5o, at 7. When used in the past, these examinations have uncov-
ered serious violations of insurance laws, including the use of unapproved policy forms and
premium rates, improper claims handlings, and noncompliance with rules pertaining to
consumer appeals and grievance processes. Id. at 17; see also Jacobi et al., supra note 21, at 177
("Close attention to the effects of formulary design and other market behavior of insurers
will be crucial to uncover potentially problematic conduct that could constitute unlawful
discrimination. It is likely that most of such conduct, if it occurs, will be relatively subtle,
and will only be revealed through attentive review of the marketplace by advocates, re-
searchers, and regulators.").
59. See Abbott et al., supra note 5o, at 2o.
6o. Cf. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 22, at 345.
61. See, e.g., id. at 359 (concluding that that the "pathway to accountability of insurers and
health plans for the quality and scope of promised coverage necessarily must entail private
enforcement rights as well as government oversight").
62. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2012) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed to preempt any State
law that does not prevent the application of the provisions of this title.").
63. St. Louis Effort for AIDS v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1016, 1022 (8th Cit. 2015) (citation omitted).
64. Maher, supra note 21, at 703.
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ance companies - that is, the first of the two dimensions discussed above. Ra-
ther, the text expressly preserves "any State law" and thus plainly extends pro-
tection from preemption to state causes of action so long as they do not hinder
the ACA."s The question thus becomes whether existing state causes of action
can provide relief for consumers injured due to violations of the law, or if a new
cause of action is needed.66
B. Existing State Causes ofAction
States have long been important battlegrounds in the fight to advance con-
sumer rights, and, over time, states have adopted a latticework of statutes and
common law claims to protect consumers.6 ' Faced with unlawful conduct by
insurers, consumers could attempt to vindicate their rights under the ACA by,
availing themselves of any of three categories of existing laws: contract law,
state consumer protection statutes, and insurance bad faith laws. However,
while these laws might support consumers in certain circumstances, they ulti-
mately fall short of providing consumers a coherent and comprehensive reme-
dy for violations. Specifically, each approach only provides a means to enforce
some, but not all, of the rights and protections afforded consumers under the
ACA, and, even then often limits the types of relief available.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d).
66. Maher, supra note 21, at 694-95 (rejecting the argument that the ACA extinguishes state law
causes of action).
67. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection
Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663,
664 (20o8) ("There is great variation among consumer protection laws, however, because
each law deals with a specific matter, and deals with it in its own somewhat unique way ....
There is no uniformity and no consistency among the various consumer protection laws and
how they are enforced because there is no national consensus on what laws are necessary to
protect consumers and who should enforce those laws."); see also Edward M. Crane et al.,
U.S. Consumer Protection Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 305, 326 (2011)
("Most states have ... amended their consumer protection acts many times, resulting in
great variation from state to state, even among states that initially adopted the same 'model'
statute. States have also enacted additional consumer protection statutes targeting specific
industries, products, or practices." (footnotes omitted)).
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1. Breach of Contract
Private insurance is defined as a "contract where one undertakes to indem-
nify another or pay a specified amount upon determinable contingencies." 68
Failure to follow through on a contractual promise gives rise to a breach of con-
tract claim.6 9 Because a health insurance contract or policy may not expressly
incorporate all of an insurer's obligations under the ACA, traditional breach of
contract claims offer only limited recourse to consumers seeking redress for
violations of the ACA.
Consider a health insurance contract that expressly lists items and services
that are included within the ACA-mandated essential health benefit package."o
If the insurer then denies coverage for one of the listed services, a consumer can
bring a breach of contract claim and effectively force the plan to comply with
the law. But if the policy is ambiguous or does not specifically reference the
ACA, the consumer may face difficulties in seeking to require the insurer to
comply with the ACA or to compensate for harm caused by the insurer's viola-
tion of the law. For example, even though health insurers must cover four
different types of addiction treatment medication as part of the essential health
benefit package, an insurer may not list all four types in its policy." If the in-
surer then denies coverage for an unlisted addiction treatment medication, the
insurer will have violated the ACA, but not necessarily the terms of its policy.
To strengthen their claim in situations where their policies are ambiguous,
plaintiffs may turn to one of two contract interpretation doctrines that place a
thumb on the scale in favor of consumers. The first doctrine, contra proferentem,
provides that "ambiguities must be construed against the drafter."72 Typically,
this rule is invoked to resolve ambiguities as a matter of last resort, after the
court has first attempted to shed light on the provision by reviewing extrinsic
68. Constance A. Anastopoulo, Bad Faith: BuildingA House of Straw, Sticks, or Bricks, 42 U. MEM.
L. REV. 687, 691 (2012) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-1-20(25) (Supp. 2011)).
69. See 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
63:1 (4th ed. 2016) ("As a contract consists of a binding promise or set of promises, a breach
of contract is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise that forms the whole or
part of a contract." (footnotes omitted)).
70. See 45 C.F.R. 55 156.11o, 156.115.
71. See Steven Ross Johnson, Nearly All ACA Benchmark Plans Violate Rules on Addiction Treat-
ment Coverage, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 7, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20160607/NEWS/1606o9927 [http://perma.cc/ZBR4-GPYG].
72. Arthur J. Park, What To Reasonably Expect in the Coming Years-from the Reasonable Expectations
of the Insured Doctrine, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 165, 167 n.9 (2012).
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or parole evidence.7 3 To protect consumers from exploitation by insurers, how-
ever, this rule traditionally has taken on a stronger role in insurance contract
disputes": "Once the court finds an ambiguity, the interpretation favoring the
policyholder prevails, without reference to the parties' intent and without ex-
amination of extrinsic evidence."7 5
The second approach, the reasonable expectations doctrine, goes even fur-
ther. In 1970, driven by concerns about the adhesive nature of insurance con-
tracts and a growing consensus that consumers were not closely reviewing in-
surance contracts, Robert Keeton proposed that insurance contracts should be
read such that "[t] he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and in-
tended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated
those expectations. "76 This is now known as the reasonable expectations doc-
trine.
How this doctrine should be applied in practice has led to considerable de-
bate. Some argue that its use should be limited to situations in which contract
language is ambiguous. This, of course, raises the question of whether the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine is distinct from contra proferentem.7 7 Others in-
terpret the reasonable expectations doctrine to mean that the expectations of an
objective, reasonable consumer should trump clear contract language when the
two conflict.7 ' However, this approach presents questions as to what an objec-
tive, reasonable consumer would expect her health insurance to cover. 7 9 Finally,
some argue for a middle ground that takes into consideration how conspicuous
the contested provision was to the consumer when the policy was purchased.so
These disagreements reflect a central tension faced by courts seeking reso-
lution to insurance disputes: insurers need predictability when setting rates so
73. See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 120 (20o8).
74. See id. at 109.
75. Id.
76. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part One, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 961, 967 (1970). While Keeton arguably offered the first clear enunciation of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine in insurance, Friedrich Kessler, Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn,
and Spencer Kimball previously made similar arguments. See Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance,
Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 42-48 (1998).
77. See Park, supra note 72, at 170.
78. See, e.g., id. at 169.
79. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Picture Begins To Assert Itself: Rules of Construction for Essen-
tial Health Benefits in Health Insurance Plans Subject to the Affordable Care Act, 24 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 437, 459 (2015).
So. See, e.g., Park, supra note 72, at 169.
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that they can cover all the claims without risking insolvency, while consumers
are poorly equipped to understand the scope of protection provided by their
insurance policy at the time of purchase." Given the complex and technical na-
ture of insurance, there are likely to be significant gaps between what an insur-
er intends its policy to cover and what consumers think their policy covers.82
Adopting a robust form of the reasonable expectations doctrine may force in-
surers to cover items and services they did not account for in advance."3 Not
doing so, however, may leave consumers in a lurch when they discover their in-
surance is narrower than they anticipated."
The Second Restatement of Contracts adopted language reflecting a more
robust version of the reasonable expectations doctrine with respect to standard
form contracts in 1979: "Where the other party has reason to believe that the
81. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59,
6o (1998); Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 697-98 ("[I]nsurance companies have a vested
interest in being able to accurately predict their obligations and make appropriate business
decisions that will foster economic success. Accurate claim forecasting enables insurance
companies to pay obligations to policyholders when unavoidable losses arise. However, the
unequal bargaining power leaves the [policyholders] vulnerable to unfair practices that the
insurance companies may use to achieve their goals."); see also Eugene R. Anderson & James
J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of
Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 342-45, 352-53 (1998) (explaining the relationship
between the reasonable expectations doctrine and the purpose of insurance contracts); Peter
Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Ex-
pectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729, 767-69 (2000) (observing that the controversy over the
reasonable expectations doctrine maps on to traditional divisions between the Williston
School and the Corbin School, "formalists and functionalists;' "legal economists and con-
sumer protectionists," and other sets of observers (quoting Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Ex-
pectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (1998))).
82. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc-
trine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 330 (1998) ("Most insureds make purchasing decisions with in-
formal and situational information that is unlikely to give them specific expectations for par-
ticular claims. To the extent that insureds consider coverage information, it is likely too
general in nature.")
83. Cf Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations
Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 18i, 273-74 (1998)
("[E]xpectations analysis ... leads to results at odds with the insurers' understanding of the
words chosen for the policy and makes outcomes turn too much on the self-interested aver-
ments of the policyholder.").
84. Cf Swisher, supra note 81, at 744 ("[I]nsurance coverage today is sold by a multitude of in-
surance agents who often emphasize the insured's 'peace of mind' and reasonable expecta-
tion of coverage, even though an insured seldom reads his or her policy, and even though
there may be a number of contractual conditions, limitations, and exclusions within the in-
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party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing con-
tained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."ss Since the
1990s, however, courts' use of the doctrine -particularly in its stronger
forms -has significantly declined in response to the reinvigoration of contrac-
tual formalism and the related ascendency of textualism and the law and eco-
nomics movement.86 One estimate from 1998 found that only six states still
used a "'pure' version of the Keeton doctrine," while an additional five states
had walked back prior endorsements." By 2007, the number of strictly adher-
ent states was down to two.88
While rare today, a robust version of the reasonable expectations doctrine -
where courts are willing to trump express contractual language -could enable
consumers to enforce ACA provisions that may only be implicit in their insur-
ance policies. Along these lines, Wendy Mariner has argued that courts should
combine the reasonable expectations doctrine with traditional rules of statutory
interpretation to resolve disputes over what insurers must cover under the
ACA's essential health benefit rules.8" For example, an insurance policy may
state broadly that it covers maternity care, as mandated by the ACA, without
identifying every item and service that falls within that general category.90 Un-
der this version of the reasonable expectations doctrine, a consumer denied a
particular service should be able to sue for breach of contract and successfully
argue that the court should look to the ACA and its implementing regulations
to establish the consumer's reasonable expectations and thereby define the
scope of maternity care required by the contract.91
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. LAw INST. 1979).
86. See Stempel, supra note 83, at 272-77; Swisher, supra note 81, at 773-77. As Swisher explains,
legal formalists believe that "an insurance policy must be construed and enforced according
to general principles of contract law, and courts therefore are not at liberty to reinterpret or
modify the terms of a clearly written and unambiguous insurance policy, but must look at
the 'plain meaning' of the insurance contract." Id. at 749 (footnote omitted). Stempel simi-
larly argues that "the growth of reasonable expectations analysis has been pared to a large
degree by the prevailing view that judges must generally be restrained strict constructionists
who do as little as possible to interfere with textual instruments and markets." Stempel, su-
pra note 83, at 265.
87. Stempel, supra note 83, at 193-95.
88. See Randall, supra note 73, at 111-12.
89. See Mariner, supra note 79, at 467-69.
go. See, e.g., id. at 454 ("ACA plans present the ... problem that the plan itself cannot fully dis-
close everything that will (or will not) be covered . . . . [T]he description of EHB categories
is so broad and vague that, apart from a few dental and vision services, the policy itself can-
not make explicit all covered benefits or exclusions.").
91. See id. at 460-61.
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Relying on the ACA to establish a baseline for reasonable expectations in
this manner may make the doctrine more appealing in jurisdictions where it is
currently disfavored. Using the ACA as a basis would cabin judicial discretion
and limit insurers' concerns about facing unpredictable obligations.92 But even
if there were a resurgence in the reasonable expectations doctrine, breach of
contract claims still would not reach violations of ACA provisions that are not
reflected in the terms of the health insurance policy. Health insurance policies
generally describe what benefits are covered and under what conditions, but
may not specify how rates are calculated and applied, the terms of the ACA's
medical loss ratio rules, or other crucial features of health plan administra-
tion." Accordingly, breach of contract claims provide only a partial solution for
consumers when their health insurers violate the ACA.
2. State Consumer Protection Statutes
Every state and the District of Columbia has adopted laws to combat
fraudulent and deceptive practices in consumer marketplaces." These statutes,
commonly known as Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices laws (UDAPs),
are important in enabling consumers to prevent harm and recover damages for
injuries caused by unscrupulous business practices.95
In their strongest form, UDAPs allow consumers to bring claims expressly
alleging that insurers violated the ACA and thus serve as an important tool for
privately enforcing the ACA. Take California's consumer protection laws as an
example. They are labeled "strong" on fifteen out of nineteen criteria by the
National Consumer Law Center, including on the criterion for insurance. 96
92. Cf. Swisher, supra note 81, at 772-73 (explaining that the lack of parameters for what consti-
tutes "reasonably predictable reasonable expectations ... helps explain the widespread judi-
cial reluctance to embrace Professor Keeton's 'strong' 'rights at variance' doctrine of reasona-
ble expectations"' (footnotes omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Sample Individual Major Medical Policy, HUMANA INS. COMPANY (2016), http://apps
.humana.com/marketing/documents.asp?file=2803190 [http://perma.cc/B4LC-S55H].
94. See Crane et al., supra note 67, at 326 ("By 1981, every state had enacted some form of con-
sumer protection act that addressed deceptive (and often unfair) trade practices.").
95. See Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A So-State Report on Unfair and De-
ceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. 5-6 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/reportso states.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3R2
-XGL71-
96. Consumer Protection in the States: Appendix B, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. 14-16 (Jan.
10, 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/analysis-state-summaries.pdf [http://
perma.cc/V3W6-4F5D]; see also Kevin J. Dunne et al., What Insurers and Their Counsel Need
To Know About California's Unfair Competition Law, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 18o, 18o (2001) ("Na-
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Like many state UDAPs, California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) prohibits
businesses from engaging in "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice."" More uniquely, however, the California Supreme Court has ob-
served that, "[b]y proscribing 'any unlawful' business practice, 'section 17200
borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices' that the
unfair competition law makes independently actionable."" Courts have since
found that the statute covers violations of both state and federal law, meaning
that a violation of the ACA is a per se violation of the UCL." Under this broad
definition of unlawful. acts or practices, plaintiffs have brought a class action
lawsuit against a California insurer for alleged violations of the ACA's medical
loss ratio rules.' 00
Yet despite its broad scope, the UCL has its own flaws, including both sub-
stantive and procedural limits that make recovery more difficult, if not impos-
sible, for certain consumers. For example, consumers do not have standing to
seek relief unless they have "suffered injury in fact and ha[ve] lost money or
property as a result of unfair competition."' Additionally, when consumers
have standing, their remedies are generally limited to injunctive relief and resti-
tution.10 2 Imagine a new enrollee in one of the insurance plans found to have
illegally imposed waiting periods for transplant services.103 Under the UCL,
the consumer could neither bring suit asking a court to order their insurer to
comply with the law without first suffering financial injury, nor seek compen-
sation for expenses (such as physician or pharmacy bills) or physical injury (if,
for example, the consumer develops complications during the waiting period)
incurred as a result of a violation. Thus, while the UCL authorizes suits against
insurance companies for violations of federal law, it fails to provide complete
recourse for all consumers.
tional insurance companies must presume that if they are to be sued anywhere under an un-
fair competition law (UCL), the most likely location is California.").
97. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016).
98. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 539-40 (Cal. 1999) (quoting
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (1996)).
99. See, e.g., Fortaleza v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
l00. See Complaint at 12, Morris v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. BC625804 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 1,
2016).
101. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2016).
102. See, e.g., Flannery v. VW Credit, Inc., 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 597 (2014), review denied (Apr.
22, 2015).
103. See State of Women's Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 18,
at 17-18.
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By and large, the utility of other states' UDAPs is even more circumscribed.
Unlike California's UCL, for instance, under most state UDAPs, it is insuffi-
cient to allege that a company violated a law. In other words, there are no per se
violations. Instead, a plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in certain
unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable trade practices that may be more or less
strictly defined and thus more difficult to meet.10 ' For example, Oregon's
UDAP lists a number of specific unlawful practices, from making false or mis-
leading representations about price reductions to organizing pyramid
schemes.os While it also includes a catchall category,10 6 the Attorney General
must first declare an unfair or deceptive practice as such before anyone can
bring suit under this catchall. 10 Among the handful of states other than Cali-
fornia in which violations of state or federal statutes regulating businesses con-
stitute per se violations of their UDAPs, additional rules can limit a consumer's
ability to bring a claim to privately enforce the ACA. For example, Illinois
courts have ruled that a violation of federal law only constitutes a per se viola-
tion of the state's UDAP if the action "offends public policy." 0 s Yet to "offend
public policy," the federal law must, among other things, provide a private right
of action itself, thereby making the UDAP at least somewhat redundant.' In
addition, some UDAPs demand that the consumer show that the defendant's
conduct had a negative public impact, 1 0 while others require proof of intent.111
These requirements create stringent hurdles for consumers who have suffered
individualized injuries and seek to vindicate the rights and protections guaran-
teed them under the ACA.
Even more problematically for consumers seeking redress for violations of
the ACA, nearly half of the states exempt insurance transactions from the scope
of their UDAPs, either in the express language of the statute or as interpreted
104. See generally Carter, supra note 95; Consumer Protection in the States: Appendix B, supra note
96.
105. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.6o8(1)(j), (r) (West 2016).
106. See id. § 646.6o8(1)(u).
107. See id. § 646.608(4).
108. Carroll v. Butterfield Health Care, Inc., No. 02-C-4903, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19287, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2003).
log. Id. at *9.
11o. See Carter, supra note 95, at 19-20; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-
Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 17-22, 32 (2005) (discuss-
ing the variance among states in the elements necessary to bring private claims under a con-
sumer protection act).
mll. See Carter, supra note 95, at 17.
1140
126.1118 2017
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
by courts.112 Opponents of including insurance transactions under UDAPs
sometimes argue that state administrative enforcement mechanisms sufficiently
protect consumers,"' despite evidence to the contrary."' Often, however, the
exception is at least partially justified by a determination that "selling an insur-
ance policy is not an ordinary consumer contract for 'goods or services"' and
thus falls outside the scope of UDAPs, which are focused on consumer transac-
tions."' Indeed, it has been argued that "the distinctive features of the insur-
ance relationship" -including the fact that the relationship between the parties
is based on a desire for protection against calamity rather than commercial ad-
vantage, as well as the unequal relationship between insured and insurer-
"remove it from the model of contract."116 But the "tortious" nature of the harm
that insurers can impose through their actions should not be a reason to deny
consumers recourse,"' although it may suggest the need for a different solu-
tion that accounts, for the complex nature of insurance relationships.
3. Insurer Bad Faith Laws
Insurer bad faith laws are one attempt to reconcile the dual contractual and
tortious nature of insurer misconduct.118 Like all contracts, insurance policies
come with an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under which insurers
are expected not to interfere with a policyholder's right to receive contracted-
for benefits.1 19 Under contract law, when the duty is breached, a consumer may
112. See id. at 15.
113. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., "That's Unfair!" Says Who -The Government or the Liti-
gant?: Consumer Protection Claims Involving Regulated Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 93, 109-13
(2007).
114. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
115. See Carter, supra note 95, at 3; Schwartz et al., supra note 113, at ill (quoting Wilder v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981)); see also Devon Green, Examining the Ap-
plicability of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act to the Insurance Industry, 36-Winter VT. B.J. 28-
29 (2011); cf Mariner, supra note 79, at 439 ("The history of health insurance includes ex-
amples of courts struggling with whether to classify health plans as service contracts or as
insurance for purposes of state insurance regulation.").
116. Jay M. Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary Between Contract and
Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469, 486 (1997).
117. Id.
11s. See Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 704; Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad
Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 77-79 (1994).
iig. See Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 695; Richmond, supra note 118, at 75-77; Douglas R.
Richmond, Bad Insurance Bad Faith Law, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 1, 3-6 (2003).
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only recover up to their policy limits. 120 This remedy, however, has been found
inadequate to fully compensate consumer injuries that arise due to an insurer's
breach, such as emotional distress and lost income, or to deter insurers from
unscrupulous conduct. 1 2 1 Approximately half of the states have imposed a cor-
relative tort duty not to engage in bad faith that provides consequential and
punitive damages to fill this gap. 12 2
Because of their relation to the duty of good faith, claims for bad faith typi-
cally arise out of an insurer's performance of its contractual duties.1 23 Most
commonly, bad faith claims allege the wrongful denial of coverage or unrea-
sonable delays in claims processing.1 24 Beyond the remedy, the primary differ-
ence between a bad faith claim and a breach of contract claim is that the former
requires a showing that the insurer's conduct was unreasonable.' 2 5 While there
is no uniform standard for bad faith causes of action, courts typically require
120. See Richmond, supra note 118, at 79 ("Were an insurer's duty of good faith purely contractu-
al, an insured's recovery generally would be limited to those damages necessary to restore
him to the position he would have occupied had the promise been performed, i.e., the 'ben-
efit of the bargain.' Such limited damages would do nothing to deter predatory or unscrupu-
lous insurers, inasmuch as their liability would always be tied to policy limits.").
121. See Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 699-700; Richmond, supra note 118. For additional dis-
cussion of the differences between tort and contractual remedies and their relevance in the
context of insurance, see infra Section II.C.3.
122. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Law Between Business Law and Consumer Law, 58 AM. J.
Comp. L. 353, 366 (2010) (citing ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGIAS S. RICHMOND, UNDER-
STANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25G (4 th ed. 2007); see also Richmond, supra note 119, at 4
("Bad faith is actionable as a tort only in the realm of insurance."); Richmond, supra note
118, at io8 ("In Braesch v. Union Insurance Co., the Nebraska Supreme Court identified
three factors justifying the application of tort principles to the decidedly contractual first-
party relationship. First, the insurance industry is affected with a public interest, as 'plainly
evidenced' by extensive state regulation. The public character of risk and loss distribution
requires that all those having to do with it be driven by good faith. Second, the non-
commercial character of insurance distinguishes insurance policies from other kinds of con-
tracts for which breaches do not sound in tort. The public purchases insurance to protect
against calamity, and for security and peace of mind. Third, the disparity of bargaining
power between insurers and insureds differentiates insurance policies from 'run-of-the mill'
contracts. In McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., a 1990 decision, the Wyoming Su-
preme Court reasoned that acknowledging first-party bad faith as a tort would offer insurers
'additional impetus for good faith."' (footnotes omitted)).
123. See Robert H. Jerry II, Bad Faith at Middle Age: Comments on "The Principle Without a Name
(Yet)," Insurance Law, Contract Law, Specialness, Distinctiveness, and Difference, 19 CONN. INS.
L.J. 13, 15 (2012).
124. See Richmond, supra note 119, at 5; see also Richmond, supra note ni8, at 111-12.
125. See Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 697; Richmond, supra note 118, at 109 ("The unreasona-
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consumers to show both that their insurer acted unreasonably and that their
insurer was aware (or should have been aware) of the unreasonableness of its
conduct.126 Because of this overlap between bad faith and breach of contract
claims, bad faith claims are unlikely to capture different violations of the ACA
than breach of contract claims. Bad faith claims may take a slightly altered tone,
however: over time there has been a growing recognition of "systemic" or "in-
stitutional" bad faith whereby a consumer argues that rather than erring once,
an insurer intentionally structured its claims processing so as to deny certain
benefits to all policyholders. 2 This likely presents the greatest opportunity to
use bad faith litigation to enforce the ACA. For example, if a consumer has rea-
son to believe that his or her insurance company is routinely denying coverage
of certain items and services in violation of both the contract and the essential
health benefit or preventive service rules, the consumer can bring a bad faith
claim in addition to or in lieu of any breach of contract claim.
Unfair insurance practice acts and unfair claim settlement statutes are
statutory analogues to insurer bad faith law, prohibiting vexatious refusals to
pay claims.128 Like common law bad faith claims, these statutes often only at-
tach liability to claim denials if the insurer's denial is deemed unreasonable."'
Because of their similarity, some states have held that unfair insurance practice
acts and unfair claim settlement statutes preempt bad faith causes of action.3 0
Problematically, while some of these statutes authorize consumers to bring
claims under them,' 3 ' many rely solely on public enforcement mechanisms,
meaning that consumers in some states have no way to recover for bad faith
conduct and are limited to breach of contract remedies.1 32
126. See Richmond, supra note 118; see also Richmond, supra note 119, at 5-6 (noting that states
vary as to whether these elements are measured by objective or subjective standards).
127. Kenneth S. Abraham, Liabilityfor Bad Faith and the Principle Without a Name (Yet), 19 CONN.
INS. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2012); Jerry, supra note 123, at 16.
128. See Richmond, supra note 118, at in5-16.
129. See id. at 116.
130. See id. at 116-17; see also Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 692-93 (noting that some states pro-
hibit private actions against insurers "either through statutory language or case law").
131. See Richmond, supra note 118, at 117 (citing STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABiL-
ITY AND DAMAGES § 9.02 (1997)); Thomas, supra note 122, at 366 ("Some states also provide
a statutory remedy that is similar to the tort remedy for bad faith.").
132. See Anastopoulo, supra note 68, at 692-93 (explaining that many states' statutory schemes
implicitly or explicitly prohibit private causes of action); Schwartz et al., supra note 113, at
110 ("In most cases, the insurance code does not provide a private right of action ... ."); see
also Sanders, supra note 53, at 298 (explaining that most state statutory provisions were
modeled on a model act that omitted a private cause of action, and observing that if this
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In sum, where states provide bad faith causes of action that sound in tort,
they may provide an important mechanism for expanding the remedies availa-
ble to consumers harmed by certain violations of the ACA. Nonetheless, like
breach of contract and UDAP-based claims, bad faith actions do not constitute
a comprehensive mechanism for challenging violations of all the ACA's insur-
ance reforms. Given the limited focus of the cause of action on wrongful deni-
als or delays of coverage, bad faith claims are unlikely to reach violations of the
ACA that do not implicate the provision of benefits, such as the law's rating re-
forms, eligibility rules, and transparency requirements.
II. AN "IMPLIED WARRANTY OF LEGALITY" IN HEALTH INSURANCE
. This Note advocates for a more comprehensive and targeted approach to
ACA enforcement than any of the three causes of action discussed above can
provide. Specifically, I propose introducing an implied warranty of legality that
individual health insurance policies and the companies offering them are in full
compliance with the ACA. This Part first describes the primary source of inspi-
ration for this approach-the implied warranty of habitability- and demon-
strates how the motivations justifying the adoption of the implied warranty of
habitability apply equally to an implied warranty of legality. It then discusses
how common law courts can adopt an implied warranty of legality without
waiting for state legislative action, as they did decades ago with the implied
warranty of habitability, and describes three key issues early courts will con-
front in structuring the warranty. This Part concludes by addressing two po-
tential barriers to adoption: the threat of increased costs and the primary juris-
diction and filed rate doctrines.
A. The Implied Warranty of Habitability
Starting in 1961, state courts across the country began adopting an implied
warranty of habitability for residential leases."' The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin was the first state high court to do so, with its opinion in Pines v.
Perssion.1 34 The best known decision came a decade later, when Judge J. Skelly
Wright issued the majority opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Javins v. First Na-
omission was intentional, the omission could either have served as a flexibility mechanism
for states or as an indication that the model act contemplated administrative enforcement).
133. See C. Stephen Lawrence, Note, George Washington University v. Weintraub: Implied War-
ranty of Habitability as a (Ceremonial?) Sword, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 1137, 1139-43 (1984).
134. 111 N.W.2d 4 o9 (Wis. 1961).
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tional Realty Corp."'s Following Pines, the Javins Court held that "a warranty of
habitability, measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations for
the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law into leases of urban
dwelling units covered by those Regulations." 6 In so ruling, the court provid-
ed common law remedies to tenants whose living conditions did not meet mu-
nicipal housing regulations." 7
These decisions marked a revolution in property law, which for centuries
had stood by the rules of caveat emptor and no-repair: tenants were to take the
land and any improvements as they found them and were barred from escaping
their lease obligations even when they faced breaches by their landlords."'
While the concept of an implied warranty was new to property, it was standard
fare in contract law." For example, by the 196os implied warranties based on
the assumed expectations of buyers - such as implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability-were well established for the sale of goods.140 The implied
warranty of merchantability served as an implicit promise that the goods being
sold were suitable for ordinary use and of average quality.' The implied war-
ranty of fitness offered a guarantee to buyers who informed sellers that they
sought goods for a particular use that the good then sold was in fact fit for that
purpose.142 Additionally, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed, it was also
common practice to read the law in effect at the time a contract was adopted
into the terms of the contract itself, "as though expressly referred to or incorpo-
rated in it.""' Thus, while the implied warranty of habitability was novel in
135. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
136. Id. at 1072-73.
137. See id. at 1072-73, lo82-83.
138. See generally Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution: Observations on the
Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793, 795-97 (2013).
139. See id. at 799-805.
140. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075-76; see also Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (Haw. 1969)
("[The implied warranty of habitability] is a doctrine which has its counterparts in the law
of sales and torts . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); Campbell, supra note 138, at 804 ("Courts were
persuaded that creating a warranty or promise that the residential leasehold would be in a
habitable condition was consistent with the obligation of warranty in other areas of the law
such as products liability.").
141. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075.
142. See id.
143. Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 165 N.E.2d 286, 290-91 (Ill. 1960) ("It is settled law that all
contracts for the purchase and sale of realty are presumed to have been executed in the light
of existing law, and with reference to the applicable legal principles .. . . Thus, the law exist-
ing at the time and place of the making of the contract is deemed a part of the contract, as
though expressly referred to or incorporated in it." (citations omitted)); see also Econ. Fuse
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adopting an implied warranty based on the housing code, the premises behind
it were well established.
The Javins court offered a multi-faceted explanation for its landmark deci-
sion. As the court explained, the legislature had adopted a regulatory scheme,
the housing code, which reflected "a well known package of goods and ser-
vices" that modern tenants expected of any "shelter."1' The court observed that
in so doing, "[t]he legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner.""'5 Yet
the court found that public efforts to enforce the housing code were "far from
uniformly effective"14 6 and that tenants were poorly equipped to bring their
homes up to code, both because of their relative inability to identify and deal
with housing defects compared to landlords,"'7 and because of their lack of
bargaining power contra landlords."'8 Accordingly, to remedy this situation,
the court borrowed a well-known concept from contract law- the implied war-
ranty - and applied it to property."'
& Mfg. Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., ill F.2d 875, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1940) ("And the
courts must read into every written contract the law governing the parties at the time the
contract is made; that, too, necessarily enters into and forms a part of every contract as if
fully and expressly incorporated therein.").
144. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
145. Id. at 1082 (quoting Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis. 1961)).
146. Id. Courts in many jurisdictions were motivated by perceived failures in the housing code.
See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
389, 414 (2011) ("More broadly, appellate courts and legislatures imposed the implied war-
ranty of habitability largely to make up for the failure of housing code enforcement. That
failure resulted in significant part from a lack of adjudicatory resources for code enforce-
ment."); see also Campbell, supra note 138, at 800-03 (describing how advocates who had
fought for adoption of the codes turned their attention to the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in an attempt to improve compliance).
147. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079 ("In dealing with major problems, such as heating, plumbing,
electrical or structural defects, the tenant's position corresponds precisely with 'the ordinary
consumer who cannot be expected to have the knowledge or capacity or even the opportuni-
ty to make adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like automobiles, and to de-
cide for himself whether they are reasonably fit for the designed purpose."' (quoting Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960))).
148. See id. ("The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well
documented. Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Vari-
ous impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such as racial and class dis-
crimination and standardized form leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it or
leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further increases the
landlord's bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and improving the exist-
ing stock." (footnotes omitted)).
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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The present-day individual health insurance market reflects similar dynam-
ics to those outlined by the Javins court: Congress has adopted a robust set of
consumer protections that all individual health plans must meet, but adminis-
trative enforcement is insufficient to prevent violations or recompense the in-
jured,so and consumers are poorly positioned to protect themselves before the
fact. As Keeton explained when he was advocating for the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine, an insurance contract is a form of adhesion contract.'s' Con-
sumers cannot bargain over the terms of the contract,' 52 and, in fact, they often
cannot even access the full policy before they purchase the plan."s' This allows
insurers to draft the terms to maximize their own interests against the consum-
er's interests."5 ' Moreover, even if consumers could negotiate or know the spe-
cific terms of their policies, they are unlikely to be able to make sense of the
policy language and cannot necessarily predict what items and services they
will need.' Consumers also are not free to switch insurance policies mid-year
if they encounter violations but do not qualify for a special enrollment peri-
od.156 Implied warranty theory provides a cause of action that can take these
structural features of the health insurance context into account in providing a
remedy to consumers.
Scholars have occasionally made passing references to the potential of ap-
plying implied warranty theory to insurance,"' yet it has gained little traction
iso. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
151. See Keeton, supra note 76, at 966.
152. See id.; see also Feinman, supra note 116, at 486 ("The relationship is an inherently unequal
one, in which the insured typically has no ability to bargain for terms and is at the insurer's
mercy in case a claim is made."); Mariner, supra note 79, at 453 (describing the limited
choice set that health insurance purchasers have on insurance marketplace exchanges).
153. See Mariner, supra note 79, at 454.
154. See Swisher, supra note 81, at 759.
155. See Mariner, supra note 79, at 445-46, 453-55.
156. See 45 C.F.R. § 155-410 (describing annual open enrollment periods); id. § 155.420 (describ-
ing special limited circumstances when individuals can enroll in a plan mid-year).
157. See, e.g., Anderson & Fournier, supra note 81, at 379 n.130; W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 546-47 (1971);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 813, 818-
19 nn.14-17 and accompanying text (2009); William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts,
57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1175, 1182-83 (1982); Joseph E. Minnock, Comment, Protecting the Insured
from an Adhesion Insurance Policy: The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Utah, 1991 UTAH
L. REv. 837, 849-50. The only work that appears to squarely address the idea is a 1925 com-
ment published by the Yale Law Journal. See Comment, The Application to Insurance Contracts
of the Implied Warranty of Sales Law, 35 YALE L.J. 203 (1925). More tangentially, William S.
Brewbaker III has argued that managed care plans be subject to an "implied warranty of
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to date.1"' This has been attributed at least in part to the fact that implied war-
ranties traditionally attach to the sale of tangible products."s' This formal dis-
tinction is not especially compelling, however: consumers are just as ill-
equipped to tell if an insurance policy offered to them "'works' for its intended
purpose" as they are with a physical good like a television or car. 160 Perhaps
more importantly, implied warranty theory appears to have been overshad-
owed by Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine.161 And, indeed, application
of the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness to insurance would likely
operate in much the same way as the reasonable expectations doctrine, as both
look to what a reasonable consumer expects an insurance policy to cover. 162
In a post-ACA world, however, implied warranty theory can do far more
than these approaches. Because the ACA sets a comprehensive regulatory
scheme against which insurance policies and insurer conduct can be judged,
courts need not speculate about what a reasonable consumer would or would
not expect. Consequently, this.approach is less radical than the traditional rea-
sonable expectations doctrine in an important way: an implied warranty of le-
gality merely enforces requirements that the ACA has already set into law ra-
quality." William S. Brewbaker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The
Implied Warranty of Quality, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118 (1997). Adam Candeub
has also advocated for the use of medical warranties to promote health care quality. See Ad-
am Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 45, 47-48 (2011).
1s8. See, e.g., Jerry, supra note 123, at 14 n.2; Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the
Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1402 n.42 (2007);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role of Insurance: The Opportunity and
Challenge Presented by the ALI Restatement Position on Breach of the Duty To Defend, 5 U.C. IR-
VINE L. REV. 587, 589 n.5 (2015).
159. See Slawson, supra note 157, at 546.
160. Id. at 546-47.
161. See Stempel, supra note 157, at 818 n.14 ("Prior to Keeton's article and scholarly recognition
of the reasonable expectations doctrine, courts had on occasion found the product/warranty
analogy helpful in resolving insurance disputes."); see also id. at 818 n.15 ("The tide against a
strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, one that would even trump clear but
problematic policy language, tended to also pull back the possible use of a breach-of-
warranty or product-defect approach to construction. Nearly thirty-five years after it was
rendered, C & J Fertilizer remains the insurance coverage case that most directly addresses
the insurance policy as a product and the insurer's promise as akin to a manufacturer's war-
ranty, although there have been cases alluding to this aspect of C &J. Fertilizer.").
162. See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is Indispensable, If We Only
Knew What for?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 170-71 (1998) ("Indeed, [the reasonable expectations
doctrine] as an equity-based concept, is somewhat analogous to warranty as a tort-contract
hybrid, particularly when warranties are implied for public policy reasons.").
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ther than imposing new, unexpected obligations on insurers.1' The implied
warranty of legality can thus better resolve the aforementioned tension be-
tween insurers' need for predictability and consumers' need for protection that
constrained adoption of the reasonable expectations doctrine.16 1
B. The Power of Common Law Courts
State adoption of an implied warranty of legality may, but need not, be the
product of legislative action. Rather, as this Note proposes, it can be judicially
enacted. To appreciate why, it is important to first draw out the distinction be-
tween finding an implied private right of action under the ACA and establish-
ing an implied warranty under state common law. While the ACA's text fore-
closes the first option, the latter remains within the power of state courts.
The past half-century has seen a retrenchment from finding implied causes
of action under federal statutes. 165 This trend, instigated by Justice Powell's
dissent in the 1979 Supreme Court case Cannon v. University of Chicago,166 is
premised on the "separation-of-powers principle of limited jurisdiction" of fed-
eral courts.16 7 Because Congress determines the jurisdiction of federal courts, if
163. Cf. Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and
Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 536 (2004) ("Applied to insur-
ance contracts, which allocate risk by definition, there is little room for forcing an insurer to
provide a service that it did not contemplate.").
164. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12 (2014) ("Under
current law, implied private rights of action are, in a word, 'disfavored."'); Bradford C.
Mank, Using 5 1983 To Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321, 353-
54 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized that it will not recognize an
implied private right of action unless there is significant evidence that Congress intended to
allow such a suit.").
166. 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Davis, supra note 165, at ii ("[T]he
Court began in the late 1970s to backtrack from the common wisdom that federal courts
were competent to imply private remedial rights. The turning point was Justice Powell's
manifesto against implied private rights of action in his dissenting opinion in Cannon.").
167. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 69 (2001) ("So long as the plaintiff had an avenue for some redress, bedrock princi-
ples of separation of powers foreclosed judicial imposition of a new substantive liability.");
Mank, supra note 165, at 354 ("The fundamental principle of separation of powers prohibits
the judiciary from assuming the legislative task of defining statutory remedies without evi-
dence that Congress intended to authorize a private right of action!'). Separation-of-powers
theory has also undergirded the Supreme Court's case law governing implied constitutional
causes of action. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Ques-
tion: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1473, 1481-84 (2013) (arguing
1149
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Congress forgoes creating a private cause of action to enforce federal law, "fed-
eral courts should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and
thereby enlarge their jurisdiction." 1 6 The movement away from implied causes
of action has also been justified by concerns for democratic accountability.169
Today, the general rule is that courts may not imply private causes of action
under federal statutes absent affirmative evidence of congressional intent.170
Applied here, it follows that because Congress did not intend to create a federal
cause of action to enforce the ACA, the courts may not imply one. A plaintiff
who comes to court relying on a theory of an implied statutory cause of action
will lose.
The analysis changes, however, if the plaintiffs claim derives from state
common law.17' As a preliminary matter, the underlying reasons for precluding
implied causes of action under federal statutes - separation of powers and
democratic accountability -do not apply with the same force at the state level.
States are not bound by the same separation-of-powers principles that the
Constitution imposes on the federal government.172 Instead, state power is
"diffused horizontally across the branches, as well as vertically between the
state and myriad local units." 7  Free from the legal constraints facing federal
courts, state courts may issue advisory opinions, appoint executive branch offi-
cials, and initiate investigations.1 74 Moreover, state courts may also be thought
that separation-of-powers concerns are responsible for the Court's decision to recognize a
right of action against a federal authority who has violated a constitutional right).
168. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1128 (20o6) ("Each of the
Justices appears committed to the notion that-all things being even remotely equal-it is
more democratically sound and, therefore, normatively superior for legislatures to specify
the available remedies for violations of rights and duties rather than to rely on the ad hoc
equitable judgments of the judiciary.").
170. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (rejecting a private right of action
to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
171. Cf. Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol,
and Other Torts, 36 WILIAMETTE L. REv. 939, 947-51 (2000) (drawing a distinction between
implying a cause of action in a statute and exercising common law power to provide a cause
of action based on the violation of a statute).
172. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARv. L. REv. 1833, 1881-97 (2001).
173. Id. at 1904.
174. See id. at 1836-37; see also Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive
La Diffirence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1273, 1276-79 (2005) (noting several differences be-
tween state and federal courts).
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of as more democratic than federal courts.17 S Many state court judges are elect-
ed, giving them a greater level of accountability and political knowledge than is
typically assumed of federal judges.17 1 In addition, state judges "are likely to
feel closer links to their local communities than federal judges, thereby enjoy-
ing a greater aura of democratic accountability."177 And just as state courts have
more democratic bona fides than their federal counterparts, many state legisla-
tures arguably have fewer, suggesting less reason to defer to traditional political
processes at the state level. 1 7
Even more importantly, however, constitutional limits to federal power
necessarily restrain the modern implied right of action jurisprudence described
above, while state power "is plenary and inherent."17 ' Because federal courts
lack the power to make common law absent exceptional circumstances, "they
must restrict themselves to statutory interpretation in deciding whether to im-
ply a cause of action from a statute."so State courts, in contrast, have historical-
ly retained broad common law powers, and their analysis of whether a cause of
175. See Hershkoff, supra note 172, at 1885-86.
176. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation,
79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1215, 1244-45 (2012). But see Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial
Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U. ICAN. L. REV. 65,
79 (2000) ("[J]udicial election cannot possibly provide any more than the most formalistic
and marginal basis for asserting the democratic legitimacy of judicial rulemaking.").
177. Hershkoff, supra note 172, at 1886 (quoting Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court
Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 537, 542);
see also Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Read-
ing Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (noting that state courts are "both
literally and figuratively closest to the people").
178. See Hershkoff, supra note 172, at 1938 ("[S]tate lawmaking devices... do not resemble
Congress in any meaningful structural sense: they are not majoritarian; they are not bicam-
eral; they lack a committee structure; and they do not encourage or require coalition-
building. The local and populist decisionmaldng devices that characterize nonfederal law-
making increase the opportunities for factions to seize control of political power, necessitat-
ing oversight that might include judicial review."); Stephan Landsman, Introduction, 49 DE-
PAUL L. REv. 275, 278 (1999) ("Professor [Richard] Abel ... finds that legislatures are often
the captives of special interests and that legislative deliberations are frequently 'secretive,
hasty' and unreasonable. By contrast, it is the courts that are 'populist and deliberative.'
Based on these observations he argues that courts should recognize the propriety of their
developing the common law and should carefully scrutinize legislative interference with it."
(qu6ting Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAULL. REV. 533, 533 (1999))).
179. Hershkoff, supra note 172, at 1887.
180. Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, so
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 554, 58o (1982).
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action exists is not limited to that which is specified in a statute.'s' Even ardent
opponents of judicial lawmaking, such as Justice Scalia, have acknowledged
this distinction between the power and role of state and federal courts. 182 Ac-
cording to the conventional view, "while [judges] may disagree strongly with
particular decisions, [they] rarely question the authority of common-law
courts, even in pivotal cases.'"8 The common lawmaking power of state courts
thus far exceeds the power of federal courts in constructing a private right of
action.
Properly understood, the implied warranty of legality would be a product
of the state common law, rather than of the ACA itself. Common lawmaking
reasons by analogy, 84 comparing the facts of one case to those of the past such
that the law evolves over time "to bring about better, fairer, and generally more
181. See id. at 577 ("At the state level, the question of courts' general power to make common law
is not at issue; . . . Federal courts' lawmaking powers, by contrast, are constitutionally cir-
cumscribed, and therefore different issues may be present when a litigant seeks an implied
right of action under a federal statute in federal court." (footnote omitted)); see also Caroline
Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory/Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REv.
781, 786 (1990) ("Because our system of government allows state courts to make law, state
court judges are not compelled to attribute the law they make to the legislature." (footnote
omitted)); id. at 816-17 ("[T]he Erie doctrine and other judicially imposed limitations on
making federal common law ... led [Justice] Frankfurter and others to attempt to attribute
the source of private rights of action to Congress, even though Congress had not expressly
provided for them .... State courts do not need to resort to such fictions. They have the
power to make common law." (footnotes omitted)); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the
Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 1689, 1702 (2014) ("Federal courts, unlike state courts, do not
claim the general common law powers of state courts to elaborate private law."); Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REv. 479, 487 (2013) ("The touch-
stone of [Chief Judge Judith Kaye's] argument for state court divergence is the fact that state
courts 'are the keepers of the common law.' Even in an age of statutes, state courts, unlike
federal courts of limited jurisdiction, retain general common law powers. Because of this,
Judge Kaye argues, state law is a complex tapestry of common law and statute, making the
court an interlocutor with the legislature, not just a passive interpreter of statutory com-
mands." (footnotes omitted)).
182. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (acknowledging that
"state-court judges possess the power to 'make' common law"); see also Judith Resnik, Con-
stricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 238
(2003) ("Justice Scalia's concern about a democratic deficit for judge-made law would seem
to include all judges, although in some cases, he has appeared to draw distinctions between
federal and state judges. If the argument is that federal judges ought to do little (and possi-
bly less than their counterparts in other jurisdictions), it would be based either on some
reading of the Constitution, or on historical practices, or on a view that conditions now re-
quire situating federal judges as specially limited." (footnotes omitted)).
183. Harry H. Wellington, The Nature ofJudicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486 (1982).
184. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 312, 360 (1997);
Vincent A. Wellman, A Common Mistake About the Common Law, 92 MICH. B.J. 39,42 (2013).
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desirable results.""' As a part of this process, common law courts "perceive the
impact of major legislative innovations and ... interweave the new legislative
policies with the inherited body of common-law principles."" 6 To establish an
implied warranty of legality, a court need only look to the state's existing body
of law and reason that the circumstances surrounding the sale of an individual
health insurance policy in the age of the ACA are conceptually similar to the
circumstances in which courts adopted the implied warranty of habitability in
the housing context. If a court does so, it is within the court's power to con-
clude that the implied warranty of legality should apply.
C. Constructing an Implied Warranty of Legality
As a product of the analogical approach to state common lawmaking, an
implied warranty of legality would likely look and operate differently across the
country. States may, for instance, adopt different burdens of proof, statutes of
limitations, and other standards based on whatever their existing implied war-
ranty doctrines provide. Yet it is worth briefly sketching out certain key con-
tours of the implied warranty of legality that have a particularly significant im-
pact on consumers' ability to successfully seek relief. As an example, begin with
the class of plaintiffs in California alleging that their insurer unlawfully denied
them rebates under the ACA's medical loss ratio rules. If they sought to add an
implied warranty claim to their complaint, they would have to show (1) that
they purchased individual health insurance through a plan subject to the ACA;
(2) that at the time of purchase they assumed the plan complied with the ACA
and its implementing regulations; (3) that the insurer violated the ACA's medi-
cal loss ratio rules by failing to provide refunds; and (4) that the violation
caused them injury." The insurer may then attempt to negate any of these el-
ements in its defense or raise other affirmative defenses.' 8
185. James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State Consti-
tutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1742 (2003); see also Drummonds, supra note 171,
at 994 ("Common law courts create new torts, as well as apply and modify existing torts, in
the exercise of their common law powers. It has always been so. General common law negli-
gence, for example, evolved from relationship-specific duties in the 19th century").
186. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
187. Cf Mary Hope, Cause ofActionfor Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability of Residence, in 3
CAUSES OF ACTION 379, § 5 (West 2016) (describing the elements of "[a] cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty of habitability" in the context of newly built residences).
188. Cf id. 5 25 (listing the negating elements of a prima facie case in a suit for breach of an im-
plied warranty of habitability).
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The following subsections lay out factors that the court should take into ac-
count in determining liability under the implied warranty of legality, as well as
the remedies that should be available to successful plaintiffs. In particular, these
subsections will focus on issues that courts and academics have highlighted as
important in the context of the implied warranty of habitability and that are
likely to arise as courts consider adopting an implied warranty of legality: first,
the kind of insurer conduct that constitutes a breach of the implied warranty;
second, whether insurers may raise waiver as a defense; and third, the remedies
that would be available to consumers. In some instances, I recommend that
courts follow a path similar to that which courts have followed in implied war-
ranty of habitability cases; in other instances, I suggest that departure is war-
ranted.
1. Basis for Finding Violations
The threshold task for courts will be to define what conduct constitutes a
breach of the implied warranty of legality. I propose that courts adopt two
boundaries to keep the implied warranty of legality from becoming a general-
purpose cause of action against insurers, rather than a tool for allowing con-
sumers to vindicate their rights and protections under the ACA.
First, courts should limit the warranty to violations of the ACA so that in-
surers will not be open to claims based on consumer expectations that are not
grounded in the statute. This, notably, would be a departure from how some
jurisdictions have approached the implied warranty of habitability. The Su-
preme Court of Hawaii, for example, "based its holding on a common sense
notion that certain conditions make housing unsuitable for human occupancy,
rather than on a statutory notion of an implied minimum quality of housing as
in Javins."" 9 California, likewise, chose not to limit the implied warranty of
habitability to the housing code, despite acknowledging that compliance with
housing code standards would suffice in most cases.190 One of the strengths of
the implied warranty of legality over the reasonable expectations doctrine,
however, is that courts can rely on a set of relatively well-established standards
of conduct governing insurers to guide their decisions. By limiting consumer
claims to violations of these standards, insurers retain a greater measure of
predictability regarding when courts may hold them liable. Absent reasonably
clear parameters for determining insurer liability, the implied warranty of le-
189. Joshua S. Wyner, Toward a Common Law Theory of Minimal Adequacy in Public Education,
1992/1993 ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 389, 413 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
19o. See Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182-83 (Cal. 1974).
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gality would likely suffer the same resistance as the reasonable expectations
doctrine."'
Of course, there will be areas in the law that remain ambiguous and that
courts adjudicating an implied warranty claim would have to interpret."'
Nothing is unique about this situation, however, and courts should fill in the
gaps just as they would in any other circumstance. The fact that this could pro-
duce some variation in how the law is interpreted and applied across states
should not bar adoption of the warranty; "[i]ndeed, the very reason that Con-
gress delegates to the states in many circumstances is to produce policy disuni-
formity-that is, to produce federal law that may mean different things in
different states."19 s The idea that state courts will be interpreting ambiguities in
the ACA should not be jarring, but seen as a natural extension of the law's
structure. While this could produce some uncertainty for insurers, it is more
circumscribed than what they face under the reasonable expectations doctrine.
The potential for variation in the law across states would also be nothing new
for insurers, given the primacy of state regulation both before and after the
ACA. 19 4
Second, courts should limit the warranty to provisions that are intended to
benefit consumers. For example, consumers should not be allowed to sue
merely because an insurer violated one of the ACA's agency reporting or ad-
ministrative simplification rules.195 This limitation is regularly used in negli-
gence per se cases, a theory of tort liability that similarly relies on statute to de-
fine the standard of care that individuals must observe. In these cases, courts
will typically only hold that a violation of a statute constitutes negligence if the
plaintiff is among the class of persons the statute is intended to protect, and the
harm the plaintiff has suffered is the type of injury the statute sought to pre-
191. See Swisher, supra note 81, at 772-73.
192. For example, a group of scholars has observed that "[n]either the federal statute nor regula-
tions define key terms, like 'unreasonable delay,' instead 'leaving the implementation of spe-
cific standards either to insurers or to the states."' Jacobi et al., supra note 21, at 142.
193. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 604 (2011). Alternatively, such
concerns may be "considerably mitigated by the fact that ... [the Supreme] Court retains
power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action." Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986).
194. See supra Section I.A.
195. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §5 1 320d-1, 13 2od-2, 13 20d-3 , 132od-4 (2012) (calling on the agency to
adopt standards and operating rules for financial and administrative transactions).
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vent.1 96 A similar approach makes sense under contract law, which traditionally
bars incidental beneficiaries from enforcing a contract to which they are not a
party, but which benefits them.19 7
This limit also may be necessary to avoid a preemption challenge. As dis-
cussed in greater depth in Section IV.A, the Supreme Court generally will not
find that a state cause of action is preempted when it merely provides damages
for an injury caused by conduct prohibited by a federal statute.1 9 8 The Court,
however, has preempted claims brought under a fraud-on-the-agency theory,
whereby the plaintiffs were effectively seeking to enforce a duty that the de-
fendant owed a federal agency, rather than a duty directly owed to the plaintiffs
themselves.19 9 In the Court's view, the agency should be able to specify what it
needs from a regulated entity without interference from third parties that could
disrupt its review processes and thus obstruct implementation of federal law.2 00
Presumably a court could come to a similar conclusion if consumers attempt to
use the implied warranty of legality to enforce duties owed by an insurer to a
state or federal agency.
2. The Defense of Waiver
Insurers are likely to try to avoid liability under the implied warranty of le-
gality by disclaiming the warranty in their policies. That is, insurers may claim
that they make no promises as to whether their policies comply with the ACA
196. See Drummonds, supra note 171, at 980 ("Of course, to consider a statutory duty for negli-
*gence per se analysis, the statute must protect a class of persons, including the plaintiff against
a class of risks that includes the kind of harm the plaintiff suffered."); Michael Traynor, Pub-
lic Sanctions, Private Liability, and Judicial Responsibility, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 787, 799
(2000) ("The court ordinarily does not apply the statute as the standard of conduct if the
statute's purpose is found to protect the interest of the state or other persons or against other
harms or hazards."). As the D.C. Circuit found in Javins, it also may be appropriate to disre-
gard de minimis violations. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The jury should be instructed that one or two minor violations standing
alone which do not affect habitability are de minimis and would not entitle the tenant to a
reduction in rent.").
197. See Gary L. Monserud, Blending the Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Benefi-
ciaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 120-25 (2000) (discussing the treatment of third-party benefi-
ciaries under the First and Second Restatements of Contracts).
198. See Jarett Sena, The Contours of the Parallel Claim Exception: The Supreme Court's Opportunity
To Define the Ill-Defined, 42 FoRDHm URB. L.J. 291, 305 (2014) (noting the Supreme Court's
recent willingness to accept parallel claims).
199. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm. 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (discussing how plain-
tiffs' claims were based on a fraud-on-the-agency theory).
2oo. See id. at 350-52.
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so that the warranty does not apply to them. Insurers could then argue as an
affirmative defense that consumers who purchase policies with disclaimers
have waived their right to bring implied warranty claims. In order for the im-
plied warranty of legality to remain viable, however, courts must treat any such
disclaimers as void and enforce the legal norm against such disclaimers by im-
posing punitive damages if and when insurers adopt them.
Whether or not parties can disclaim implied warranties varies under exist-
ing law. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, parties can disclaim many of
the warranties that would otherwise apply to a sales contract.2 0' This approach
is based on general freedom of contract principles.202 In contrast, disclaimers
have largely been prohibited with respect to the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.2 03 To the extent they are allowed, they are typically regarded "with intense
suspicion when the purchaser is an ordinary consumer" rather than a commer-
cial investor or other sophisticated party.204 Supporters of the implied warranty
of habitability justified banning disclaimers by pointing to the power imbal-
ances between tenants and landlords and the importance of the policies pro-
tected by the warranty.20 ' As the Javins court noted, allowing landlords to dis-
claim the implied warranty of habitability would effectively "nullify the object
of the statute."20 6 The housing code prescribes mandatory standards that land-
lords must meet, not suggestions subject to negotiation between landlords and
tenants.
These policy concerns apply with equal force to the implied warranty of le-
gality, which like the implied warranty of habitability is premised on compli-
ance with a statutory code. They are also buttressed by a further consideration:
the threat of risk selection that could-occur if insurers were allowed to opt out.
Willingness to purchase an insurance policy that disclaims the warranty could
201. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2002).
2o2. See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, Disclaimers of Implied Warranty in the Sale of New Homes, 34VILL.
L. REV. 1123, 1153-54 (1989).
203. See Melissa T. Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in
Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 424-25 (2010).
204. Frona M. Powell & Jane P. Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 316 (1990).
205. See Lonegrass, supra note 203, at 425.
206. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting Narra-
more v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899)); see
also Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty: The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv.
99, 112 (1982) ("Most of the courts that have declared the warranty of habitability, as in
Javins, have said that the compelling policy reasons supporting the new law would be sub-
verted if the parties to a lease could, by contract or otherwise, disclaim, waive, or modify the
warranty.").
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be used as a proxy for an individual's relative risk in two ways. First, by pur-
chasing such a policy, the consumer would be waiving her right to bring a law-
suit under the implied warranty of legality even if the policy were non-
compliant with the law. Thus, waiving parties represent a lower litigation risk
than consumers who retained the right to sue for breach of the warranty. Sec-
ond, insurers may presume that consumers who are willing to waive the war-
ranty expect to have lesser health care expenses than someone who wants to re-
tain the full protections available to them under the law. A woman facing a
high-risk pregnancy, for instance, will want assurance that her health insurer is
not skirting the ACA's maternity coverage and out-of-pocket cost requirements.
It is in her interest to find a plan that is subject to the implied warranty of le-
gality. The implied warranty of legality is, in effect, insurance that her insur-
ance complies with the ACA or at least, that she is placed in the position she
would have been in as if the insurer had complied if a violation occurs.2 0 7 in
contrast, someone who only expects to go to the doctor for an annual physical
will neither value nor seek out that additional level of protection.2 08
Thus, an insurer that insists on disclaiming the warranty is effectively offer-
ing less comprehensive insurance and could attract a lower-risk population
than an insurer that does not disclaim. Over time, this risk segmentation could
drive up the average costs of those insurers who are subject to the warranty
compared to those that have opted out.' Non-disclaiming insurers will have
207. Cf Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court's Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It Might
Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2323, 2378 (2010) ("Compensation ... spreads risk
among all consumers of the relevant good or service, rather than forcing the unlucky few
who are injured to bear the full cost of that risk. . . .").
208. Cf. Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and
Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 28 (2010) ("[I]nsurers charge a higher premium based
upon a rational presumption that higher-risk individuals will more often choose to purchase
insurance than lower-risk individuals.").
2og. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classifica-
tion, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 378-79 (2003) (describing how risk classification can lead to ad-
verse selection). The ACA enacted three programs intended to stabilize the individual insur-
ance market. These could, in theory, also limit the negative effects of risk segmentation from
disclaiming the implied warranty of habitability. Yet two of these programs are set to expire
at the end of 2016, and the effectiveness of all three programs has been questioned. For a
general description of these programs, see Cynthia Cox et al., Explaining Health Care Re-
form: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors, ICISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17,
2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-risk-adjust
ment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors [http://perma.cc/35HX-FPFF]. For criticisms and
concerns that these programs are inadequate to protect against adverse selection, see Jona-
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to begin disclaiming the warranty themselves to avoid this outcome and stay
competitive. Sooner or later, all insurers in the market will have disclaimed the
warranty, and consumers will be back to square one, unable to seek redress for
violations.
To prevent this outcome, state courts can declare that the implied warranty
of legality is mandatory and treat any waivers that insurers may put into their
policies as void, as courts have done with the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.210 If an insurer nonetheless includes waiver clauses in its policies to try to
deter less sophisticated consumers from invoking their rights, the court could
levy punitive damages in addition to any other applicable remedies.21 1 in so do-
ing, the court can ensure that the implied warranty of legality is available to all
consumers and is not subverted into a tool for segmenting risk.
3. Remedies
The ACA benefits consumers in a wide variety of ways: from requiring in-
surers to provide coverage of certain benefits to certain populations,2 12 to limit-
ing premiums and out-of-pocket costs, 2 13 to increasing transparency and dis-
closure rules, including requirements to provide language access services to
consumers with limited English proficiency.2 14 The types of remedies consum-
ers may seek in response to violations of these and other rules will necessarily
vary as well. Which remedies will be available in practice will turn on whether
courts conceive of the implied warranty of legality as arising under contract or
tort law. In keeping with how some courts have treated the implied warranty of
habitability as well as insurance claims more generally, I recommend a hybrid
approach under which both contract and tort remedies are available.
zio. See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 47 (D.C. 1983).
211. See id. at 46. In an analysis of Weintraub, C. Stephen Lawrence explained that while punitive
damages are not typically available in contract cases, the inclusion of a disclaimer could be
considered "conduct performed with fraudulent intent and in willful disregard of another's
legal rights," and thus "viewed as tortious and ... sufficient to justify an award of punitive
damages." Lawrence, supra note 133, at 1163. Accordingly, even in states that find that the
implied warranty of legality sounds solely in contract, a separate action in tort may enable a
court to award punitive damages for unlawful disclaimers.
212. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (providing for guaranteed availability of coverage); id.
5 300gg-14 (extending dependent coverage to children up to the age of twenty-six); id.
§ 18022(a) (requiring coverage of essential health benefits).
213. See, e.g., id. 5 300gg-13 (requiring coverage of certain preventive services without cost-
sharing); id. § 18022(c) (imposing limits on annual out-of-pocket spending).
214. See, e.g., id. 300gg-15 (requiring insurers to provide a summary of benefits and coverage
rules for plan enrollees).
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Either contract or tort law may provide an adequate remedy if a consumer
only wants a court to declare what the law requires and order insurers to com-
ply. Equitable remedies under contract law include specific performance,
whereby the court orders the breaching party to fulfill its promises if money
damages cannot fully compensate the non-breaching party for her losses.2 15
While courts consider specific performance an extraordinary remedy out of
concern "that requiring performance interferes with the promisor's liberty,"2 16
specific performance is uniquely appropriate in the context of implied warran-
ties that are based on the breaching party's pre-existing statutory or regulatory
obligations. The court is not imposing on the promisor's liberty, but enforcing
a congressionally enacted requirement. Tort law similarly allows for injunctive
relief when monetary damages are inadequate to remedy an injury.2 17 Specific
performance or tort-based injunctive relief will be adequate in cases where con-
sumers face future or ongoing injury from a violation, such as if an insurer un-
lawfully denies coverage for a non-urgent medical service or refuses to extend
coverage to dependent children under the age of twenty-six.218 Therefore, to
the extent consumers seek prospective relief, it may make no difference wheth-
er the implied warranty of legality sounds in contract or tort.
Contract and tort law part ways, however, when it comes to providing fi-
nancial compensation to injured parties. Under contract law, remedies are pri-
marily focused on compensating the non-breaching party for foreseeable eco-
nomic harms.2 19 Often this means giving the non-breaching party the "benefit
of the bargain" -that is, putting them in the position they would have been in
absent breach. 22 0 This would be appropriate if, for instance, an insurer failed to
provide a full refund under the medical loss ratio rules (as has been alleged in
California), 22 1 or if an insurer required a consumer to pay greater out-of-pocket
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 351, 357 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); E. Al-
lan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149-50, 1153-
55 (970).
216. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 296-97 (1979).
217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1979).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-6(a) (requiring coverage of essential health benefits); id. § 300gg-14
(requiring coverage of dependent children).
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1981); Farnsworth,
supra note 215, at 1147 ("Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach; rather, it is aimed at relief topromisees to redress breach.").
220. Farnsworth, supra note 215, at 1147-48.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18; Complaint, supra note oo, at 12-13.
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costs than the law allows.222 Tort law, in contrast, generally bars recovery for
purely economic injuries,223 but allows courts to award damages for personal
injury.224 This will be important if, for example, an individual is impermissibly
denied coverage for a transplant and suffers injury or death due to the resulting
delay in treatment.22 5
The two areas of law also diverge when it comes to punitive damages. Tort
law generally allows for punitive damages, for the purposes of both punish-
ment and deterrence.226 Contract law, in contrast, bars punitive damages unless
the conduct at issue is independently tortious.22 7 This distinction is often justi-
fied by the theory of "efficient breach." Courts should not seek to deter breaches
through punitive damages because the breaching party will only breach if it is
economical to do so after taking into account compensation for the non-
breaching party.228 Courts should be less hesitant to order punitive damages in
the context of the implied warranty of legality, however, given that an insurer's
obligations are not merely private promises they entered into voluntarily and
now regret, but are mandatory rules imposed by Congress. Punitive damages
would also be important if consequential damages are unavailable. Absent ei-
ther punitive or consequential damages, insurers have "a strong financial incen-
tive to delay providing medical treatment,"22 9 because some consumers may
never challenge the denial in the first place. The remedy for those that do will
otherwise only be an order that the insurer pay for the previously denied bene-
222. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 5 300gg-13 (prohibiting cost-sharing requirements for coverage of pre-
ventive services); id. § 18022(c) (imposing limits on annual out-of-pocket spending).
223. See, e.g., Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from
Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. io8i, 1095 (20o8); Catherine Paskoff Chang, Note,
Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why Courts Should Allow Tortious Recovery for Intentional
Concealment of Contract Breach, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 47, 58 (2oo5).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 901 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1979); Feinman, supra
note 116, at 481-82.
225. See State of Women's Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 18,
at 17-18.
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 908 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAw INST. 1981).
228. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 630-32
(1999).
229. Katherine T. Vukadin, Hope or Hype?: Why the Affordable Care Act' New External Review
Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1201, 1232
(2012) (quoting Healthcare Quality: Grievance Procedures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on La-
bor and Human Res., io5th Cong. 12 (1998) (statement of Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Department of Labor)).
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fits, thus allowing the insurer to accumulate interest in the interim. 230 While
this may be a small amount at the individual level, insurers cover tens if not
hundreds of thousands of lives in any given state, suggesting that the aggregate
can be significant.23 '
Despite these traditional distinctions between tort and contract law, the line
between remedies under the two regimes is not always so clear for implied war-
ranties. While the Javins court held that a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability "gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract,"232 other ju-
risdictions have described the implied warranty of habitability as "a multi-
faceted legal concept that encompasses contract and tort principles."233 These
courts capitalized on this hybrid status to allow for consumers to recover under
both theories, including contract-based consequential damages and tort-based
personal injury damages. 2 34 Additionally, even when operating under a contract
theory of liability, some courts have pushed the boundaries of what is compen-
sable and allowed renters to recover personal injury damages on the grounds
that the harm was reasonably foreseeable when the parties entered into the
contract.23 5
As discussed earlier, insurance also does not fit neatly within the bounds of
traditional contract law.236 As the California Supreme Court has observed,
"[w] hereas contract actions are created to enforce the intentions of the parties
230. See id.; see also Green v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667 F.2d 22, 25 (9th Cit. 1982) ("If an
insurance company can act with impunity and be liable in any event only for the money it
originally owed the policyholder, it will have a financial incentive to resist payment in as
outrageous a manner as possible.").
231. Cf. Market Share and Enrollment of Largest Three Insurers-Individual Market, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/market-share-and-enrollment-of-largest-three
-insurers-individual-market [http://perma.cc/L9QG-A3Z4].
232. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cit. 1970).
233. Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009).
234. See, e.g., Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) ("Liabil-
ity is based upon a breach of the warranty of habitability at which time the tenant may re-
cover (i) for all damages available under traditional remedies for breach of con-
tract ... including any consequential damages within Hadley v. Baxendale guidelines; and
(2) for personal injury and personal property damage in tort under traditional negligence
principles."); Sample v. Haga, 824 So. 2d 627, 631 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); see also Steven W.
Feldman, Expanded Merchant Tort Liability, Democratic Degradation, and Mass Market Stand-
ard Form Contracts-A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and
the Rule of Law (Part II), 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 163, 181 (2014) ("It turns out ... that there
are indeed two schools of thought on whether this implied warranty of habitability sounds
in contract or in tort.").
235. See Lonegrass, supra note 203, at 427.
236. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
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to the agreement, tort law is primarily designed to vindicate 'social policy."' 2 3 7
Thus, while the relationship between the consumer and insurer is based on a
contract, the inherent inequities between the parties and the "quasi-public ser-
vice" nature of insurance implicate tort duties.2 38 As with claims brought
against landlords under the implied warranty of habitability, courts have begun
to expand the types of damages that are available when contract claims are
brought against insurance companies. Specifically, although courts traditionally
limited contract damages to the terms of the insurance policy, states have be-
gun to allow insurance policyholders to recover for consequential damages on
the theory that they were also foreseeable. 239 As the New York Court of Appeals
explained, consequential damages are "designed to compensate a party for rea-
sonably foreseeable damages,"24 0 and an insurer would certainly know "that
failure to perform would (a) undercut the very purpose of the agreement and
(b) cause additional damages that the policy was purchased to protect against
in the first place." 241 Thus, consumers who suffer additional injury under such
circumstances should be able to recover for those damages as a part of their
bargained-for benefit.24 2 The Second Restatement of Contracts likewise
acknowledges that some states have enacted statutes allowing punitive damag-
es in insurance disputes.24 3
The blurriness between contract and tort with respect to both implied war-
ranty and insurance suggests that the implied warranty of legality may likewise
occupy a hybrid status. Courts thus may provide a blend of remedies that vary
based on case-specific circumstances. Since consumers will seek different relief
depending on what provisions of the ACA their insurers violate, courts should
remain flexible by providing remedies that correspond to the harms incurred.
This sort of flexibility is necessary because of the broad array of violations pos-
sible under the ACA, given the diversity of requirements imposed on insur-
ers.2"4 Alternatively, even if a state court treats the implied warranty of legality
as falling within the scope of contract law, consumers should remain able to re-
237. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988).
238. Feinman, supra note 116, at 486.
239. See Jay M. Levin & Lisa A. Szymanski, Consequential Damages Resulting from an Insurer's
Breach of Contract, BRIEF, Summer 2012, at 46, 47.
240. Bi-Econ. Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127, 131 (N.Y. 2008).
241. Id. at 132.
242. See id.
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (AM. LAWINST. 1981).
244. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
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ceive consequential damages for foreseeable physical injuries that result from
an insurer's breach.
D. Addressing Potential Barriers to Adoption
Having described how courts can adopt and structure the implied warranty
of legality, this Section seeks to defend the implied warranty against two po-
tential barriers to adoption. First, this Section acknowledges that achieving
greater compliance with the ACA through the implied warranty of legality may
result in premium increases. I contend, however, that this is a result of redis-
tributing the costs of noncompliance and is wholly consistent with and justified
under the ACA's egalitarian principles. Accordingly, cost considerations should
not dissuade courts from adopting the implied warranty of legality. Second,
this Section considers the primary jurisdiction and filed-rate doctrines, which
insurers often invoke to limit litigation. I argue that these doctrines would have
only a narrow impact, if any, on claims brought under the implied warranty of
legality. Thus, like concerns about costs, these considerations should not pre-
vent the adoption of the proposed warranty.
1. The Costs of (Non-) Compliance
The goal of the implied warranty of legality is to increase compliance with
the ACA. This will entail added costs for health insurers, stemming from at
least two sources: (1) obligations that insurers would otherwise avoid, includ-
ing the cost of covering certain benefits and individuals, and (2) consequential
damages that insurers are required to pay for injuries that result from viola-
tions of the ACA. 245 The insurers will then either take those costs as a loss or,
more likely, redistribute them across all their policy holders in the same risk
pool through future premium increases.24 6 Critics of the implied warranty of
245. This is not to say that increasing compliance with the law will always result in higher costs
to an insurer. For example, covering birth control without cost-sharing may be cost-neutral
or decrease health insurance costs in the long-term. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 (2014) (citing Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,877 (July 2, 2013)).
246. These costs could include both expenses directly tied to coming into compliance with the
law (either voluntarily or upon court order) and administrative costs associated with litiga-
tion. The bulk of the former category would likely be in the nature of actual health care ex-
penses that an insurer would otherwise have avoided paying. Because health insurance pre-
miums are tied to utilization, insurers could pass on the cost of any increases in health care
expenditures to consumers in the form of higher premiums. See generally Drivers of 2o16
Health Insurance Premium Changes, AM. ACAD. ACTUAIUES 1-2 (Aug. 2015), http://www
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legality may argue that these added costs are reason alone not to adopt it.24 7
While rising health care costs are a real concern for consumers,248 any added
costs from the implied warranty of legality, like the costs generated by the
ACA's insurance reforms, are justifiable on redistributive grounds.
The ACA's insurance reforms are inherently egalitarian, pooling risk "equal-
ly and broadly among healthy and sick insureds."24 9 insurers must offer cover-
age to all, healthy or sick, at the same rate.2 50 Moreover, this insurance must
comply with certain minimum standards so that it actually provides consumers
meaningful protection against risk.2"' As critics of the ACA point out, provid-
ing more comprehensive coverage to higher-risk consumers also increases the
cost of health insurance, particularly for those who were benefitting under the
prior system.2 52 These costs do not appear out of thin air, however. Prior to
.actuary.org/files/Drivers 2016_Premiums o8osis.pdf [http://perma.cc/D49Q-PD6A]
(describing how actuaries develop premiums). Insurers have less ability to shift administra-
tive cost increases (whether due to compliance or litigation) on to consumers due to the
ACA's medical loss ratio rules, under which individual market insurers must expend at least
eighty percent of premium earnings on medical expenditures and quality improvement in-
vestments. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). If an insurer is at or near this level, it
must either reduce other administrative costs or pay for litigation through other revenue
sources, such as investment income. If an insurer is above eighty percent, it may incorporate
the litigation costs into its premiums until its administrative costs reach twenty percent.
247. Cf. Michael A. Brower, Comment, The "Backlash" of the Implied Warranty of Habitability:
Theory vs. Analysis, 6o DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 865-66 (2011) (summarizing arguments from
Charles Meyers and Richard Posner opposing the implied warranty of habitability on cost-
related grounds).
248. See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, Health-Care Costs Ate Your Pay Raises, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2016,
12:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2o16-o9-28/health-care-costs-ate
-your-pay-raises [http://perma.cc/UHD8-Z8RH]. But see Beth Pinsker, For Most Americans,
Healthcare Costs Aren't Skyrocketing, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:43 PM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/us-datadive-healthcare-idUSKCN2B24H [http://perma.cc/EJ2C
-W9 2X].
249. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1887 (2011).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (prohibiting health status rating). The law, however, still allows in-
surers to vary rates based on age by a 3:1 ratio and tobacco use by a 1.5:1 ratio. Id. Prior to the
ACA, most states had not adopted any limit on either age or tobacco rating in the individual
market. See Giovannelli et al., supra note 48, at 3, 5.
251. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6 (enumerating the comprehensive health insurance coverage
requirements).
252. See, e.g., Premium Increases for "Young Invincibles" Under the ACA and the Impending Premium
Spiral, AM. ACTION F. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.americanactionforum.org/research
/premium-increases-for-young-invincibles-under-the-aca-and-the-impending [http:/
perma.cc/C3RH-AHPN]; see also Robert M. Damler & Paul R. Houchens, ACA Premium
Impact-Variability of Individual Market Premium Rate Changes, MILUMAN 1-2 (2012),
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passage of the ACA, they simply were not shared evenly across the population.
Some consumers paid disproportionately more than others for insurance.25 3
Other consumers paid for their health care expenses out of pocket without the
benefit of adequate insurance, often incurring significant medical debt along
the way.2 54 And some went without care, incurring costs in the form of poorer
health outcomes and even death.2 55 In enacting the ACA, Congress chose to
spread these costs more evenly across consumers and address cost growth
through other mechanisms, such as delivery and payment system reforms.256
The implied warranty of legality reinforces the ACA's horizontal redistribu-
tion scheme. Today, the lack of a private right of action under the ACA puts the
costs of noncompliance on consumers. If, for example, an insurer unlawfully
denies certain consumers coverage, those consumers alone bear the costs of
paying for health care services out of pocket or not receiving the care they need,
when they need it. Just as "it is unjust to ask the ill and injured to pay the costs
of unavoidable conditions that impair their welfare;' it is equally unjust to force
http://www.in.gov/aca/files/IndividualMarketPremiumRateChangeVariability-und
er theACAFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/29H6-RZNN].
253. See, e.g., Nowhere to Turn: How the Individual Health Insurance Market Fails Women, supra
note 3, at 10 ("[A]t 40-years-old, women's monthly premiums ranged between 4% and 48%
higher than men's monthly premiums. .. .").
254. See, e.g., Sara Collins et al., Losing Ground: How the Loss of Adequate Health Insurance Is




("Adults with gaps in health insurance coverage or those underinsured were most at risk of
having problems with medical bills: three of five reported any one medical bill problem or
accrued medical debt, more than double the rate of those who had adequate insurance all
year (26%).").
25S. See, e.g., David Cecere, New Study Finds 45,ooo Deaths Annually Linked to Lack of Health
Coverage, HARv. GAZETTE (Sept. 17, 2009), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2oo9
/o 9 /new-study-finds- 4 50oo-deaths-annually-linked-to-lack-of-health-coverage [http://
perma.cc/PVA4-DCUZ] (describing a study conducted by the Harvard Medical School and
Cambridge Health Alliance finding that nearly 45,000 annual deaths are associated with lack
of health insurance and a forty percent increased risk of death among the uninsured); Col-
lins et al., supra note 254, at 15 ("People who were uninsured at the time of the survey or who
were insured but had spent a time uninsured during the past year experienced the highest
rates of cost-related problems getting needed health care. More than 70 percent of adults
who were uninsured for any time during the year cited cost-related problems accessing
needed health care, up from just over half in 2001.").
256. See generally Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 6oi, 601-03 (2010) (arguing that the ACA "institutes myriad elements
that experts have long advocated as the foundation for effective cost control").
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these unlucky consumers to pay the costs of ACA violations themselves.2 57 As
the law currently stands, these consumers cannot take any steps to protect
themselves from unanticipated violations of the law. By adopting the implied
warranty of legality, however, courts can permit the costs of compliance to be
distributed more broadly across the population.25 8
The implied warranty of legality, like the ACA itself, also advances vertical
redistribution by asking those who earn more to pay more of any added
costs. 25 9 The ACA accomplishes this by providing premium tax credits to indi-
viduals and families earning up to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level if
they purchase their insurance through an ACA-created health insurance mar-
ketplace (also known as an exchange) .260 These tax credits cap the amount eli-
gible consumers must contribute to premiums to a percentage of income based
on a sliding scale. 2 61 The federal government predicts that, on average, these
tax credits will lower eligible consumers' premiums by seventy-three percent in
2016.262 Because the ACA calculates tax credit levels as a percentage of an indi-
257. Hoffman, supra note 249, at 1925.
258. See Moncrieff, supra note 207, at 2378 ("The second benefit of state judicial regulation, par-
ticularly through tort, is that it provides compensation to injured parties .... Compensation
serves two important goals: First, it spreads risk among all consumers of the relevant good
or service, rather than forcing the unlucky few who are injured to bear the full cost of that
risk, and second, it serves non-utilitarian values of social justice and morality, requiring an
injuring party to make its victims whole .. .. [Compensation] forces insurers, manufactur-
ers, and doctors to spread the risk of error among their consumers (through price increases)
and to recompense their injured consumers for the harms that they cause.").
259. Cf Hoffman, supra note 208, at 33 (discussing "vertical equity" and "health redistribution").
260. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)( 3 )(A) (2012). As of March 31, 2016, 9.4 million out of 11.1 million con-
sumers enrolling in health insurance through a marketplace received premium tax credits.
March 31, 2016 Effectuated Enrollment Snapshot, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(June 30, 2016), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets
/2016-Fact-sheets-items/2016-06-30.html [http://perma.cc/NQ6Y-UG8N].
261. See I.R.C. § 3 6B(b)( 3 )(A). As an example, "a premium credit recipient living in Lebanon,
KS -the geographic center of the continental United States -with 2016 household income
of $17,655 (15o% FPL; according to premium credit regulations) would be required to con-
tribute 4.07% of that income toward the premium for the standard plan in his or her local
area. In other words, the maximum amount that this person would pay for the year toward
the standard plan is approximately $719 (that is, $17,655 x 4.07%), or around $60 per
month." BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44425, ELIGIBILITY AND DE-
TERMINATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND COST-SHARING SUBSIDIES:
IN BRIEF 5 (Mar. 23, 2016).
262. See Office of the Assistant Sec'y for Planning & Evaluation, ASPE Issue Brief: Health Insur-
ance Marketplace Premiums After Shopping, Switching, and Premium Tax Credits, 2015-2016,
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 3 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/198636/MarketplaceRate.pdf [http://perma.cc/X85Z-AUXR].
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vidual's income, rather than as a percentage of premiums, the tax credits would
also shield eligible individuals from any year-to-year premium increases that
result from the adoption of the implied warranty of legality.2 63 This means that
the federal government would pay any costs associated with adoption of the
implied warranty of legality on behalf of low-income consumers. In contrast,
today, the least well-off are no more protected from the costs of insurer non-
compliance than the wealthier.
Thus, the implied warranty reinforces the ACA's substantive promises to
consumers, but does so in a manner that builds on and even furthers the law's
redistributive framework. Costs should not be a reason to oppose the implied
warranty of legality. If anything, the fact that costs of noncompliance are oth-
erwise shouldered unevenly is reason to adopt it.
2. The Filed Rate and Primary Jurisdiction Doctrines
Insurers frequently turn to two judge-made doctrines to avoid litigation:
the primary jurisdiction and filed rate doctrines. Both of these doctrines are
premised on the theory that courts should abstain from adjudicating matters
where the law has empowered an administrative agency to act. These doctrines
recognize that administrative agencies often have specialized knowledge and
discretionary authority to which courts should defer.264 These doctrines origi-
nated in and still have their greatest salience in the context of third-party chal-
lenges to a regulated entity's rates.265 Yet even acknowledging this, their impact
on claims brought under the implied warranty of legality will be limited. After
all, rates are only one of many areas regulated by the ACA, and consumers
would still be able to bring various other claims before a court.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine governs the general allocation of authori-
ty between agencies and courts.266 As articulated by the Supreme Court, it "ap-
plies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and .. . enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body."267
263. See id.
264. See, e.g., Vonda Mallicoat Laughlin, The Filed Rate Doctrine and the Insurance Arena, 18 CONN.
INS. L.J- 373, 376-77 (2011-12); Aaron J. Lockwood, Note, The Primary jurisdiction Doctrine:
Competing Standards ofAppellate Review, 64WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 710 (2007).
265. See Laughlin, supra note 264, at 377-82; Lockwood, supra note 264, at 711-17.
266. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956) ("The doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction ... is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.").
267. Id. at 64.
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State courts have uniformly adopted the doctrine2 68 and commonly apply it to
cases involving insurance rates, premiums, and policy forms.2 69
If applied broadly, this doctrine may inappropriately limit consumers' abil-
ity to get recourse under the implied warranty of legality.o Yet multiple safe-
guards are available to courts seeking to limit the doctrine's negative effects.
First, courts have discretion over whether to refer cases to administrative bod-
ies in the first instance, considering whether the interests of uniformity and ex-
pertise "will be aided by [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction's] application in
the particular litigation."2 71 If a court determines that it can resolve the case
without an agency's expertise or if the agency has no authority to act with re-
spect to the consumer's claims, the court can hold on to the case.272 This may
occur where, for example, the ACA does not leave room for administrative dis-
cretion and the court merely must determine whether the insurer violated it.
Second, if primary jurisdiction is found to apply, the judicial process is merely
suspended while the administrative body takes action.273 The plaintiff may re-
vive his or her claim after the administrative body has ruled.' Third, to avoid
excessive administrative delays, courts have occasionally imposed deadlines on
268. See Craig A. Cohen et al., Using the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in Insurance Litigation, BRIEF,
Summer 2007, at 12, 15.
269. See id. at 15-16.
270. See Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1290-92 (2007).
271. W Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
272. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 268, at 15 ("[The Supreme Court of Texas] further recog-
nized that the primary jurisdiction doctrine will not be applied where the issue is one inher-
ently judicial in nature or when the administrative agency is powerless to grant the relief
sought and has no authority to make incidental findings that are essential to the granting of
relief. In addition, the Texas court held that intervention by the court in administrative pro-
ceedings may be permissible when an agency is exercising authority beyond its statutorily
conferred powers." (footnote omitted)). While cases appear to exist where referrals were
made "on issues that the agency simply was not equipped or authorized to answer" or
"where the issue so referred was not necessary to resolve the claim itself," these appear to be
avoidable mistakes rather than necessary outcomes of the doctrine itself. Knippa, supra note
270, at 1306.
273. See Cohen et al., supra note 268, at 14.
274. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) ("Referral of the issue to the administrative
agency does not deprive the court of jurisdiction ... ."); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego Cty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 18o, 199 n.29 (1978) ("The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not necessarily allocate power between courts and agencies, for it
governs only the question whether court or agency will initially decide a particular issue, not
the question whether court or agency will finally decide the issue." (citing 3 KENNETH CULP
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 19.01 (1958))).
1169
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the agency to make a ruling. 27 5 Accordingly, so long as courts exercise care, the
primary jurisdiction doctrine need not be a bar to litigation, including claims
brought under the implied warranty of legality. Instead, it may provide a useful
mechanism for incorporating agency input while preserving a consumer's right
to judicial recourse when insurers violate the ACA.
The filed rate doctrine, in contrast, stands for the proposition that courts
will not hear claims implicating rates that have been filed and approved by reg-
ulatory agencies.276 Thus, when applicable, it is a total bar to judicial recourse.
While jurisdictions vary, however, there are important limits on the scope of
the doctrine that will prevent the filed rate doctrine from barring most, if not
all, potential claims brought under an implied warranty of legality.
First, the filed rate doctrine typically only applies when consumers directly
challenge insurance rates as unlawful. In most states, the filed rate doctrine nei-
ther bars litigation challenging whether the policy forms an insurer filed with
the state comply with applicable regulations, nor blocks other contract claims
seeking to challenge how an insurer has interpreted its policy or to enforce cer-
tain terms of a policy.2 " This distinction is grounded in justiciability concerns.
While courts may be poorly equipped to evaluate and retroactively revise an in-
surer's rates -which involves making complex predictions about how many
people will enroll and how much care they will utilize 2 78 - disputes over wheth-
er policy forms or others terms of an insurance contract comply with the ACA
present more straightforward questions that courts can answer.2 7 9 Given this
limit, the filed rate doctrine would not affect any claims brought under the im-
plied warranty of legality that do not directly challenge an insurer's rates, such
as claims that an insurer is unlawfully denying coverage of certain benefits, re-
quiring consumers to pay copays, or withholding rebates.
Second, many jurisdictions only apply the filed rate doctrine to bar claims
for damages, thus allowing claims for injunctive relief to proceed. 2 " This limit
means that individuals may still be able to challenge an insurer's rates so long
as they only seek future relief.
275. See, e.g., Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 206 (5 th Cir. 1988).
276. See Laughlin, supra note 264, at 373.
277. Id. at 391, 442. Additionally, this bar only applies if the violation is reflected in the rate that
was filed. Courts have allowed claims alleging that insurers charged rates in excess of what
was filed. Id. at 403-04. Courts have also allowed claims contending that filed rates were im-
properly applied. Id. at 404-05.
278. See Drivers of 2o16 Health Insurance Premium Changes, supra note 246, at 2-5.
279. See Laughlin, supra note 264, at 391.
280. See id. at 396-99.
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Third, some jurisdictions refuse to apply the doctrine in cases where ad-
ministrative review is considered insufficient.2 8 ' The Ninth Circuit, for in-
stance, has held that merely filing rates "does not render them immune from
challenge" or "legitimize" rates that do not comply with the law. 282 This ap-
proach is logical: while deference to an administrative agency may justify in-
voking the filed rate doctrine when regulators have authority to approve or dis-
approve rates, there is no agency action to defer to in states with review
authority alone.283 Because justiciability concerns remain, however, any chal-
lenges to rates brought under the implied warranty of legality may present a
circumstance where the court could invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine to
refer any retrospective reallocation of rates to an agency while otherwise main-
taining jurisdiction over the case.
Taking these three factors into account, the filed rate doctrine is far narrow-
er than the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Because it wholly removes cases from
a court's jurisdiction, however, it also comes with a bigger bite when it does
apply. In part due to its perceived harshness,2 84 the doctrine remains conten-
tious. 2 8 s Some state court judges have even suggested that its days are num-
bered.286 Indeed, because both the filed rate doctrine and the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrines are judge-made, courts can roll them back just as courts can
push forward the implied warranty of legality. Even if they remain in place,
however, the main limit they would impose on the implied warranty of legality
would be to bar certain challenges to insurer rates. This alone is not reason
enough to justify not adopting the warranty.
III. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF LEGALITY BEYOND THE ACA
Looking forward, the implied warranty of legality need not be limited to
enforcing the ACA. This Part offers preliminary thoughts on the extent to
which the implied warranty of legality can and should be invoked in other
281. See id. at 387, 410-16.
282. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 394 (9th Cit. 1992); see also Clark v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. o8-6197 (DRD), 2011 WL 940729, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011)
("Whether a state agency has the authority to approve reasonable rates is critical.").
283. See Laughlin, supra note 264, at 410.
284. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) ("[T]he filed rate
doctrine may seem harsh in some circumstances . . . .").
285. See Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004).
286. See id. at 963.
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markets to enforce other regulatory regimes. First, I return to the practical bar-
rier facing almost any state cause of action: federal preemption. As discussed
above, the implied warranty of legality is viable as a mechanism for enforcing
the ACA at least in part because of the ACA's very narrow approach to preemp-
tion. This Part will discuss the rules that are likely to apply when a federal stat-
ute is silent or otherwise does not go as far as the ACA to fend off preemption.
Then, I turn to the normative question of when else courts should adopt the
implied warranty of legality, assuming no preemption. Private rights of action
can benefit both individuals and society, but they come with costs. I identify
two additional features of the insurance and housing markets that justify creat-
ing implied warranties, and I contend that these characteristics should be used
to identify other markets where the adoption of the implied warranty of legali-
ty would be equally appropriate.
A. Preemption and the Parallel Claims Exception
As explained earlier, the ACA does not preempt "any State law" unless it
"prevent[s] the application" of the ACA's insurance reforms.2 87 In this context,
preemption is not a significant concern as the implied warranty of legality
should not block implementation in any way. Yet not all federal statutes include
preemption clauses that so clearly preserve state causes of action, and, indeed,
some of these statutes expressly bar state causes of action.2 88 While an implied
warranty of legality will be a non-starter in the latter case, Supreme Court
precedent regarding the parallel claims exception to preemption suggests that
the implied warranty of legality may remain viable when statutes are silent or
ambiguous.
Under the parallel claims exception, the Court has regularly exempted from
preemption claims based on "state duties [that] . . . 'parallel,' rather than add
to, federal requirements."289 justifying the parallel claims exception, in Med-
tronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court explained that "[t]he presence of a damages rem-
edy does not amount to the additional or different 'requirement' that is neces-
sary under the statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for
manufacturers to comply with identical existing 'requirements' under federal
287. 42 U.S.C. 5 18041(d) (2012).
288. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101, 112
Stat. 3227, 3227-28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preempting class
actions for securities fraud arising under state law).
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law."290 Because the implied warranty of legality simply provides a mechanism
for consumers to enforce the terms of a federal statute, either through injunc-
tive or compensatory relief, it should generally fall within the bounds of the
parallel claims exception. However, there are potential limits.
First, the Court held in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee that the
parallel claims exception does not necessarily apply to statutes regulating areas
of the law where states have not traditionally played a role, such as food and
drug safety, or when there is reason to think Congress sought uniformity in en-
forcement.291 This is not a concern in the health insurance context given states'
historic leadership in this area and the fact that the ACA expressly allows for
continued state-level variation,2 92 but it could impact uptake of the implied
warranty of legality in other markets where states traditionally have not played
a role.
Second, even if the implied warranty of legality is generally feasible under
the parallel claims exception, Buckman suggests that preemption could still
block certain claims. Specifically, preemption could be a barrier if consumers
seek to enforce duties the regulated entity owed an agency rather than duties
the entity directly owed them. In Buckman, the plaintiffs claims were based on
a fraud-on-the-agency theory: they were injured because a device manufacturer
secured approval by making fraudulent representations to the U.S. Food &
Drug Administration (FDA).293 In the Court's view, these claims "inevitably
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Ad-
ministration's judgment and objectives."2 94 For example, were the Court to al-
low the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-agency claims to survive, applicants seeking to
fend off future litigation "would then have an incentive to submit a deluge of
information that the Administration neither wants nor needs, resulting in addi-
tional burdens on the FDA's evaluation of an application."295 One could imag-
ine the implied warranty of legality having a similar disruptive effect if con-
29o. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
291. See 531 U.S. 341, 347, 350-53 (2001).
292. See supra Section I.A; see also Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform,
Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1764 (2013)
("Like countless other cooperative federalism programs, the ACA encourages states to ex-
periment with how they choose to implement the new federal statute. In the context of the
ACA's insurance-exchange provisions alone, the statute mentions 'state flexibility' six times
and explicitly contemplates that the exchanges will look different across the states." (foot-
note omitted)).
293. Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 347, 350-52.
294. Id. at 350.
295. Id. at 351.
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sumers could use it to enforce reporting requirements and other administrative
duties.
In sum, consumers will likely have greater success invoking the implied
warranty of legality in the context of markets traditionally subject to state regu-
lation than in new, emerging markets or those primarily regulated at the feder-
al level. Additionally, consumers will be more likely to defeat preemption de-
fenses when they bring claims to enforce statutory provisions that directly
benefit them rather than duties owed to federal agencies, even if such duties
carry indirect benefits.
B. Guiding Principles for Future Applications
Providing people with private rights of action to enforce statutory and con-
stitutional provisions offers benefits at both the individual and societal level.2 96
For individuals, as this Note has already touched on, a private right of action
provides an important mechanism to recoup damages for injuries suffered due
to another's violation of the law. This carries with it obvious financial benefits,
but the sense of empowerment that comes from standing up for oneself in
court can also promote dignity and integrity, and "give people control over
their lives."297 For society, providing individually enforceable rights can "pro-
mote order and predictability, thus enabling people to act upon reasonable ex-
pectations in managing their affairs."298 It can also advance democratic values
by enabling individuals to represent themselves.2 99 In addition, private en-
forcement of a federal regulatory scheme can specifically benefit overburdened
regulators by bringing more resources and attention to an issue and alerting
regulators to areas that need more attention. 00
At the same time, recognizing private rights of action "may conflict with so-
cial utility because recognizing rights is sometimes inefficient."'o1 How then,
should courts determine when social utility is sufficiently great to outweigh po-
tential inefficiencies that may result from private enforcement? One answer is
that courts should defer to the legislature and simply look to whether state
296. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987).
297. See id.; see also Oman, supra note 37, at 32-34, 62 (arguing that individuals vindicated their
sense of insulted honor through litigation).
298. Zeigler, supra note 296, at 679.
299. See Steven B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLAlKL. REv. 637, 666 (2013).
300. See id. at 662-64; Moncrieff, supra note 207, at 2376-77.
301. Zeigler, supra note 296, at 679.
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causes of action are preempted.302 However, simply because Congress has left
room for state solutions does not necessarily mean that courts should go out of
their way to adopt them. Thus, for courts establishing the implied warranty of
legality for the first time and seeking to build in limits to the applicability and
availability of the implied warranty across a range of contexts, I identify two
features common to housing and insurance that justify providing consumers a
private right of action to enforce the rights and protections afforded them by
statute. These two characteristics can serve to guide the application of the im-
plied warranty of legality to other contexts in the future.
First, in these markets, redress is dependent upon the presence of compul-
sion or involuntariness in the transaction. In the housing context, this compul-
sion is de facto: participation in the rental housing market is a practical necessi-
ty for millions of Americans who cannot afford to purchase a home. In
insurance, it is de jure: individuals must maintain minimum essential coverage
to avoid tax penalties.o For individuals who do not qualify for employer-
sponsored insurance or public programs, this means that they must purchase
individual health insurance coverage.o' While these consumers may have a
choice of plans when they first enroll, they cannot change plans mid-year ab-
sent a change in financial or living circumstances. 3 05 They may report their
problems to state and federal regulators, but, as Part I shows, their ability to
seek recourse is limited in the absence of a general private right of action. Thus,
while the ACA affords consumers a vast new array of protections, it does not
empower them to take action to respond to violations. This is adhesion-plus:
not "take it or leave it" but simply "take it."3 o0
Providing enforceable rights to consumers in a "take it" situation is not
merely a matter of market fairness, but civic fairness. Along these lines, Nan
Hunter argues that a "right of participation should be viewed as reciprocal to
302. Cf Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77
B.U. L. REv. 559 (1997) (arguing that courts should not preempt state tort remedies absent a
clear statement from Congress). But see Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal
Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1995) (arguing that Congress
should leave preemption determinations to the courts).
303. I.R.C. § 5oooA (2012).
304. Buntin et al., supra note i, at 80.
305. Open Enrollment Period, HEALTHCARE.Gov, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/open
-enrollment-period [http://perma.cc/9PA7-UXRH].
3o6. See Mariner, supra note 79, at 452-53 ("Persons obligated to obtain minimum coverage under
the ACA do not have that option. They must 'take' a policy, because they cannot 'leave it'
without penalty." (footnote omitted)).
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the individual's obligation to purchase insurance." 07 Hunter conceives of this
right of participation in the context of individual engagement in ACA-related
policymaking,os but it can also take the form of individual engagement in ACA
enforcement effortso.30 Adjudication should be understood as an "avenue [] for
political expression" and "an alternative point of entry into political life."3 o
Through the implied warranty of legality, consumers gain a voice in shaping a
market where they are otherwise largely held both captive and passive.
Second, the regulated transaction -here, the purchase of individual health
insurance -is of great societal importance. In fact, this transaction involves a
Rawlsian-type primary good, a good that, behind a veil of ignorance, individu-
als would choose to distribute equally to ensure fair and just opportunities for
advancement in society.311 While Rawls himself did not identify health care as
307. Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
1955, 1967 (2011).
308. See id. at 1967-68 (tracing the "consumer-citizen framework embodied in the ACA back to
the 1930S where it emerged as a "tactic for melding democratic values with the preservation
of capitalism"); id. at 1983-85 (highlighting the creation and governance of health insurance
exchanges as an opportunity for citizenship engagement under the ACA).
309. Cf Hershkoff, supra note 172, at 1917 (describing how adjudication can serve as an "avenue[]
for political expression" and "an alternative point of entry into political life" in the context of
arguing for "an enlarged concept of justiciability").
310. Id. at 1916; see also Burbank et al., supra note 299, at 666 ("Meaningful access to opportuni-
ties to defend and advance rights through litigation can amount to a form of active and di-
rect citizen participation in the enterprise of self-government, constituting a valuable and
important facet of democratic life. This form of participation may incorporate interests into
the governing process that would be rendered impotent by simple majoritarianism. Alt-
hough majoritarian institutions are often thought emblematic of democracy, such institu-
tions do not exhaust forms of democratic governance. As Malcolm Feeley and Edward Ru-
bin put it, 'perhaps a democracy must respect the rights of individuals or be governed by
organic law or provide opportunities for expression and participation or establish conditions
for rational discourse,' and courts may be distinctively suited to contributing these elements
to a broader democratic regime." (quoting MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDI-
CIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S
PRIsoNs 333 (1998))); Peters, supra note 184, at 350 ("In the Anglo-American tradition, we
restrict the role of the judge to that of making 'a choice between competing views, or a me-
diation among such views'; to the parties who will be affected by the judgment we leave the
definition and articulation of those views. Thus the litigants subject to a court decision are in
a very real sense, as Edward Levi observes, 'bound by something they helped to make.' This
echoes our general preference for government through participation over government by fi-
at. (footnotes omitted)).
311. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (defining health as a natural primary
good, essential to all life plans). By referencing a "veil of ignorance;' John Rawls discusses
the hypothetical situation in which individuals make decisions while unaware of their per-
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such a good in his original writings, others have since suggested that it "could
readily be added to the list."312 As Norman Daniels has argued, meeting peo-
ple's health needs is foundational to their ability to function normally in society
and "to choose among life plans they can reasonably pursue, given their talents
and skills.""' Empirical studies confirm a connection between poor health and
annual earnings,3 14 as well as the important role that health insurance plays in
health outcomes. 1 s Insurance itself is also associated with positive economic
effects, both for individuals 16 and society at large. 1 ' As the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court observed in Pines when it adopted the implied warranty of habit-
ability, "[t]he need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in
this era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor."318 So, too, is the need and social desira-
sonal characteristics, such as class and social status, and their natural assets and abilities,
such as strength and intelligence. See id. at 12.
312. Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL.
L. REV. 8o, 8o6; see also Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care,
13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55, 61 (1984) ("At least some forms of health care (such as broad ser-
vices for prevention and health maintenance, including mental health) seem to bear the
earmarks of Rawlsian primary goods . . . .").
313. NORmAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 29, 77 (2008).
314. See Jack Hadley, Sicker and Poorer- The Consequences of Being Uninsured: A Review of the Re-
search on the Relationship Between Health Insurance, Medical Care Use, Health, Work, and In-
come, 60 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 3S, 57S (2003).
315. See id. at 38S- 4 5S (summarizing research on the connection between health insurance status
and health outcomes and mortality).
316. See, e.g., Bhashkar Mazumder & Sarah Miller, The Effects of the Massachusetts Health Reform
on Financial Distress, FED. RES. BANK CHI. 3 (July 2015), http://www.chicagofed.org/pub
lications/working-papers/2014/wp-01 [http://perma.cc/R5ZH-QG3L] (finding that the
"Massachusetts reform improved financial outcomes across many dimensions: it improved
credit scores, reduced delinquencies, lowered the fraction of debt past due and reduced the
incidence of personal bankruptcy").
317. James A. Thornton & Jennifer L. Rice, Does Extending Health Insurance Coverage to the Unin-
sured Improve Population Health Outcomes?, 6 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 217,
228 (2008) (finding that "there may be large social economic benefits and net benefits from
extending health insurance coverage to the uninsured").
318. Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Wis. 1961); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Paternal-
ism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 771-72 (1983) (distinguishing "judicial or leg-
islative attack" on contracts of adhesion for paintings from those for housing, and conclud-
ing that "[i]t is ... misleading to describe the nondisclaimable warranty of habitability as
simply a device for correcting an imbalance in bargaining power" and that " [m]ore accurate-
ly, it is an instrument of redistribution that seeks to shift control over housing from one
group (landlords) to another (tenants) in a way that furthers the widely shared goal of in-
suring everyone shelter of at least a minimally decent sort").
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bility of access to adequate health care -which, for all but the very wealthy,
means access to adequate health insurance."'
This Note is not the first proposal to identify these principles as reasons to
justify intervention in a market, but it takes their import further. As Shlomit
Azgad-Tromer argued, "[i]f consumers have bounded voluntariness, and the
moral values of society support the assignment of the market as serving a basic
need, that market should be considered essential and be regulated at a higher
degree of paternalism."320 While Azgad-Tromer is focused on regulatory inter-
ventions, such as price controls and subsidies,3 21 this Note is motivated by the
belief that regulatory paternalism alone is not enough to protect these "essen-
tial markets" if regulators cannot consistently ensure that the rules are fol-
lowed. When these circumstances apply, courts should empower consumers to
enforce the protections that they are provided by bringing actions under an
implied warranty theory.
CONCLUSION
The implied warranty of legality would allow consumers to enforce the
myriad rights and protections granted them under the ACA. Absent this, limi-
tations in the administrative enforcement mechanisms and pre-existing state
causes of action leave open the chance that many, if not most, violations of the
law will go without remedy. Individuals will continue to face unnecessary
charges, excessive premiums, and denials of care from which the law was
meant to protect them. This will surely cause financial injury to many and may
even result in preventable physical and emotional injury to some.
319. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Feb.
20, 2013) http://healthland.time.com/2013/02/20/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing
-us/print/[2/26/2013 [http://perma.cc/4J63-7VWVI (describing the high prices of hospital
services); John Walker, Patients Struggle with High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31,
2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices
-1451557981 [http://perma.cc/ZQR7-K8T4] (describing the high prices of prescription
drugs); see also Catherine Hoffman & Julia Paradise, Health Insurance and Access to Health
Care in the United States, 1136 ANNALs N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 149 (20o8) (showing that health in-
surance coverage strongly correlates to access to a wide array of health care services, includ-
ing preventive care and treatment for acute and chronic conditions).
320. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, A Hierarchy of Markets: How Basic Needs Induce a Market Failure, 14
DEPAUL Bus. & CoM. L.J. 1, 4 (2015). Joshua Wyner has similarly pointed to compulsory ed-
ucation laws to help justify finding an implied warranty to an adequate education. See
Wyner, supra note 189, at 412.
321. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 320, at 4.
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Like the implied warranty of habitability before it, the implied warranty of
legality can help correct the power imbalance between consumers and insurers
still left after enactment of the ACA. It can empower consumers to stand up for
themselves and seek individualized redress, as well as to engage civically by
participating in enforcement of the law. Moreover, the implied warranty of le-
gality will further the ACA's redistributive goals by ensuring that the costs of an
insurer's noncompliance with the law are shared more equitably across the
market.
In adopting an implied warranty of legality, state courts can also assert a
position for themselves in defining how the law will operate within their juris-
diction. While this role has received little attention to date, it is a natural exten-
sion of the ACA's federalist structure. Continuing to misconceive of the ACA as
a federally and administratively driven statute will deny consumers the benefit
of the law's full potential. While the ACA is transformative in the protections it
provides to patients and consumers, it did not upend the traditional state-
federal dynamic in insurance regulation. States have long built on minimum
federal floors to better protect consumers and should do so again here, where
the ACA falls short.
And states need not stop there. The concept of an implied warranty of le-
gality should be applied to other federal and state regulatory schemes under
which consumers face similar pressures and bargaining dynamics. Indeed, even
if the ACA were repealed or amended, the implied warranty of legality could be
used to enforce state health insurance rules. The adaptability of the implied
warranty of legality is rooted in its simplicity: consumers should be able to
trust that when they purchase a heavily regulated product or service, it is in
compliance with the applicable rules. If it is not, the provider has broken an
implicit promise on which its contracts were based and should be held respon-
sible.
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